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Abstracts 
This paper investigated some macroeconomic and financial stylised facts in the context 
of the developing economies of the Guinea and the five Anglophone West Africa countries, 
consisting of The Gambia, Ghana, Liberia, Nigeria and Sierra Leone. These six countries 
were collectively known as the West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ) up till 2014. The 
informal economies of the WAMZ countries, some macroeconomic stylised facts in 
respect of theoretical propositions like Phillips curve, Lucas output-inflation trade-off 
and International parity conditions (purchasing power parity (PPP) conditions, 
international Fisher effect - IFE, and uncovered interest parity - UIP) were evaluated. 
Also, the relationships between domestic cyclical output and some macroeconomic 
variables were considered in the assessments of business cycles from the view-point of 
the developing economies of the WAMZ and the developed economies of Germany, the 
United Kingdom and the United States. Some empirical regularities in exchange rates and 
the behaviours of foreign exchange markets were also evaluated. This paper covered the 
period of time spanning between 1991 and 2015 on the average. Findings and results 
revealed that variabilities of the cyclical components of seven selected macroeconomic 
variables examined were lower in the developed economies of Germany, the UK and the 
US than the developing economies of the WAMZ, thus supporting this stylised fact that 
the cycles of macroeconomic variables are more volatile in developing economies than in 
developed economies. There were evidences to infer that the validity of both absolute 
and relative PPP could not be established in the WAMZ, thus making PPP to be irrelevant 
in the exchange rate determination throughout the WAMZ. Results generated also 
suggested that IFE failed to hold for the WAMZ’s bilateral relationships. These results 
yielded supports for the conjecture that if PPP fails to hold, IFE will not hold. Evidences 
were also gathered towards drawing conclusions that UIP does not hold across the 
WAMZ. From the empirical evaluation performed, it is evident that the Phillip curve 
relationship does not hold in the WAMZ (apart from Ghana) over the period covered by 
this study.  There were inferences that the Lucas output-inflation trade-off hold better in 
the formal economies of the WAMZ than the informal economies. Results generated 
through the evaluation of seven stylised facts of exchange rates and foreign exchange 
markets behaviour were mixed. 
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1. Introduction 
Stylised facts are consistent empirical findings which are accepted as truth and basis for 
theories. Nevertheless, there are usually, inaccuracies in these empirical regularities. This 
paper examined some macroeconomic and financial stylised facts in the context of the 
developing economies of Guinea and the five Anglophone West Africa countries 
comprising of The Gambia, Ghana, Liberia, Nigeria and Sierra Leone (hereinafter referred 
to as the West African Monetary Zone, the WAMZ), in order to determine if these facts 
hold in these economies.  
Over time, large body of literature in macroeconomic quantitative analytical research had 
established a good number of stylised facts in macroeconomic fluctuations and business 
cycles in many countries. These empirical regularities have been adapted as empirical 
basis for the formulation of many related theoretical models. This work established some 
regularities in macroeconomic fluctuations in the WAMZ as a matter of significance and 
necessity for these countries coming together in monetary integration. This is significant 
in highlighting the characteristics of the behaviours of the economies evaluated as 
precursor to empirical assessments of the feasibility of monetary integration of West 
Africa. 
The major objective of this research work was to reveal some macroeconomic and 
financial characteristics and behaviours of the WAMZ member countries from the view-
points of some relevant stylised facts and theories while simultaneously testing the 
validity of the stylised facts and theoretical proposition within the context of the 
developing economies of the WAMZ. This paper evaluated the informal economies of the 
WAMZ countries, some macroeconomic stylised facts, the relationships between 
domestic cyclical output and some macroeconomic variables and some theoretical 
propositions (Phillips curve, Lucas output-inflation trade-off and International parity 
conditions). Further efforts were made at looking into some empirical regularities in 
exchange rates and the behaviours of foreign exchange markets.  
2. Informal Economic Activities in the WAMZ 
Informal economic activities are those market-based production of goods and services 
(legal or illegal) that are hidden from official authorities, and thus, escape detection in the 
official estimates of national income/products for regulatory, institutional and monetary 
3 | P a g e  
 
reasons. Generally, the avoidance of governmental bureaucracy or regulatory burden are 
some of the regulatory reasons for informal economic activities. Monetary reasons may 
be about the avoidance of the payment of taxes and levies while institutional reasons may 
be weak legal system, weak rule of law, poor quality of political institutions and 
corruption.  
For an economy, the degree of unreported/unrecorded economic activities causes lots of 
concerns because the high extent of the involvements of firms and households in 
activities that are hidden from government, the more the distortions in fundamental 
economic analyses. For instance, informal activities limits tax revenues as well as create 
bureaucratic and regulatory burdens. Apart from these, informal economic activities can 
have negative effects on the efficiency and effective functioning of the formal economic 
sector as there is bound to be discrepancies between national expenditure and national 
income as well as discrepancies between official and actual labour force. Going by these 
attributes of an informal economic activities, it suffice to state that the WAMZ countries 
exhibit significant traces of informal economy which is concentrated in services, 
commerce, distribution, construction or locally sourced food production or raw 
materials. This informal sector provided a large proportion of employment and income 
for the WAMZ countries. 
Although, it is believed widely that firms operating in informal sectors are usually small 
(family-operated) businesses, a striking feature of the West African informal sector is the 
presence of large informal firms/enterprises which are hugely successful in various weak 
business environments characterised by absence of regulations enforcement that 
encourages and allows these large firms in the informal sector to operate with impunity 
in many cases. There are cases of tax evasion and payment of pre-emptive tax within the 
informal sector. Because of lack of improvement in the African business environments in 
the real sense, many people prefer to operate in the informal sphere of the economy. It is 
suffice to add that it is expensive to be legal within African economies. 
 The incidence, size and magnitude of the informal economic activities in the WAMZ 
economies have serious economic (and political) consequences for the proposed 
monetary zone and its member economies. Some of these implications could be 
summarised as: declining tax revenue (owing to untaxed transactions), bias of social, 
economic and financial information, efficiency and productivity losses (arising from the 
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competitive advantage of these informal activities), underreporting of income (due to 
large number of poor people which declare low income, but have substantial 
expenditure), distortions in the allocation of resources and significant welfare losses. 
However, some literature argued in favour of some potential benefits of informal 
economic activities which are apparent within the developing economies of the WAMZ 
where around 66% of income generated from the informal economic activities is spent 
instantly in the formal economies (Schneider and Enste, 2002). Nevertheless, for the 
WAMZ economies, informal activities are sources of overall economic growth. 
Worldwide, with the avoidance of government regulations (on minimum wages, 
taxation), the informal economy is more flexible and is better able to respond to market 
conditions and rapid changes than as obtained within the formal economy (Smith, 1994). 
Informal activities propel structural changes necessary for economic development 
because of the informal economy’s quick adaptation to changes in economic situations. 
Furthermore, lower prices of goods and services within the informal economy may likely 
have some positive distributional effects when such informal activities are in favour of 
low-income earners (Portes et al, 1989). Because of deficiency in planning for 
reallocation of resources, some jobs are only available because their full cost (income tax) 
are too expensive to balance-off their consistently low level of productivity (Reyneri, 
2003; Prager, 1983; and Carter, 1984). 
Commonly, informal economy depicts small and unorganised producers operating on the 
fringes of the formal economy. However, in the case of Africa in general and the WAMZ 
specifically, reverse are the cases in which informal economies dominate the stagnant 
and static formal economies. In the WAMZ, informal economic activities play dominant 
roles (particularly in the area of employment) where small operators co-exist with very 
large politically well-connected informal enterprises that operate with impunity, as well 
as organised networks, with very little information on who is involved and the nature of 
involvement or business.  
Due to the prominence of informal economic activities in the WAMZ, some of the 
discrepancies that manifests are: (i) underground hidden production (within the sphere 
of legal activities) that create value-added but are deliberately hidden from government 
in order to avoid tax payments or to avoid meeting certain legal standards (minimum 
wages, maximum labour hours, health and safety issues and so on), or to avoid 
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compliance with administrative procedures (completion of administrative forms and 
statistical questionnaire); (ii) illegal production which are productive activities that 
generate goods and services whose sales, distribution or possession are forbidden by law, 
or productive activities which are usually legal, but are illegal when performed by 
unauthorised procedures/producers; (iii) production by household (for own final use) 
which are productive activities that result in goods or services consumed or capitalised by the households that produce them. It is therefore suffice to state that the WAMZ’s 
informal sector is a symptom of institutional deficiencies. Specifically, the large informal 
activities within the monetary zone are caused by failure of government to enforce 
regulation appropriate for large firms involved as well as the burden-some nature of 
regulation and taxation that inhibit compliance.  
The reality of the informal economy in Africa holds constantly as the sector plays a central 
role in African economies. Studies revealed that sub-Saharan Africa (where informal 
activities account for around 80% of non-agriculture labour and nearly half of the GDP) 
is the most informal continent of the world. This sector accounts for a large share of GDP 
and huge share of employment. ILO (2014) estimation revealed that the sector employs 
around 90%  of rural African employees, accounts for 80% of total labour force in African 
countries and 77.2% of workers in the sub-Saharan Africa were self-employed or own-
account workers or contributing family workers while 66% are in non-agricultural 
employment. Most key sectors of the WAMZ economies which are within the ‘informal sector’ are: 
commerce, handicrafts (artisans), agriculture, most manufacturing and transportation 
etc. Specifically, in the WAMZ, informality drives employment. Some largest and fastest 
growing sectors are informal economic sector as reflected in wholesale trade, retail trade 
(the largest locus of informal activities), real estate, transportation, hospitality, 
construction, agriculture, artisan activities (carpentry, mechanics, painting, tailoring etc) 
as key. Most informal economic activities are highly mobile without fixed place of work, 
particularly, in the cases of street hawkers, traders on street pavements, travelling 
salesmen, including carpenters, mechanics, small scale business owners who generally, 
do not own or rent their workplace but occupy unused spaces and vacate whenever such 
spaces are needed by the rightful owners. This predominant nature of informal economic 
activities in the WAMZ serves as major factor inhibiting development in the sub-region. 
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However, the informal sector only contribute as low as 3% of total tax collection, despite 
its economic relevance. The existence of large informal firms (which, though, meet the criteria for formal status) manifests the WAMZ’s state failures as evident by corruption, 
weak enforcement capabilities of government, adverse business environment etc. These 
factors, among others, increase the costs (thus reduce the benefits) of businesses that 
operate formally within the monetary zone. Nonetheless, it is difficult to accurately 
determine how the informal sector drives the economies of the WAMZ countries. This is 
due to lack of data and absence of critical understanding of self-manifestation of informal 
activities in the region. Data on informal employment in Africa in general are scarce or 
not even available For instance, in the WAMZ, commercial motorcyclists are very core 
part of the whole economy, but there have been difficulties in capturing their value-added 
as well as harnessing their potentials. These and other factors thus make compilation of 
data of on these informal activities difficult and not properly handled as the trade hawker 
has no trading permit, many firms do not have regular and up-to-date books of account 
for the purposes of easy monitoring and taxation. According to Smith (1994), many large 
informal firms are skilful in producing falsified financial statements, misleading 
accounting certificates and several versions of financial statements (differently for banks, 
government, their businesses) with the assistance of dubious accounting firms that 
specialise in these versions of accounting reports.1  Furthermore, from the financial services perspective, the WAMZ’s informal sector is 
characterised by limited access to bank credit facilities and this causes operators in this 
sector to resort to informal credits from families and friends; and the critical factor 
causing this is the demand by banks for loan documents before loan applications are 
considered as it is practically difficult for operators in the informal sector to make those 
required documents available. 
Discrepancies that are usually created by informal economic activities in the WAMZ 
countries are: (a) gaps between statistics on national expenditure and national income of 
the WAMZ countries if for tax purposes, operators in the informal sector can hide their 
income but not their expenditure. Large tax burden can likely encourage economic 
activities in the informal sector); (b) gaps between figures for official labour forces and 
                                                          
1
 Versions of these accounts are evolved according to specific uses and they are easily certified by accounting firms who are 
usually part of the arrangement. 
7 | P a g e  
 
actual labour force if official labour force participation declines while the total labour 
force participation is assumed constant. Unemployment (which is the lack of work in the 
formal sector) would prompt or force some people to work in the informal economic 
sector; (c) gaps between cash payment and increase in currency demand. This can be 
reveal in the currency outside bank/narrow money fraction of broad money because 
those involved in informal economic activities usually conduct their activities in cash. 
Apart from domestic informal activities, informal cross border trade (which are 
international flows of goods that are not reported (or incorrectly reported) by customs 
authorities of a country) is a major form of overall informal economic activities in the 
WAMZ countries where goods pass through border posts with false customer 
declarations. Goods cross borders (either through border posts or elsewhere along the 
borders) without the knowledge of custom authorities. Within the WAMZ, casual 
observations reveal that informal cross border trade (ICBT) is thriving. 
As it affects Africa continent generally and the WAMZ specifically, Golub (2014) 
established that a significant component of ICBT activities are re-exports in which goods 
are imported formally into a low-tax/low cost country with the intent of clandestinely 
trans-shipping them thereafter into the neighbouring countries with higher taxes, 
restrictive import quotas, costly trade facilitation services or higher regulatory 
standards. It is a long-time tradition to trade local primary products across borders in 
order to balance local shortages and stabilise prices, due to the need for livelihood and 
life sustenance caused by limited and shrinking formal employment opportunities. 
Generally, in West Africa, recorded intra-regional trade is small, but ICBT is pervasive, 
with re-export being particularly significant form of intra-regional trade. In recent days, 
ICBT in the WAMZ is viewed to be around 50% of intra-regional trade (Benjamin, Golub 
and Mbaye 2015). More often, estimates of ICBT is in multiples of official cross-border 
trade. For instance, World Bank (2013) reported that in 2011 the bilateral trade of 
domestically-produced goods between Nigeria and Cameroon was $230 million, in 
comparison with officially-recorded flows of $10 - $40million.  
Two features of African national boundaries (which as well, reflect in WAMZ’s national 
boundaries) from which ICBT can be fully understand are: (i) the huge divergence in 
economic policies between neighbouring countries; and (ii) the ease of cross-border 
shipment of goods by informal operators. Consequently, due to these factors, smuggling 
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flourishes in the WAMZ as a result of the contradictions between hugely unchallenged 
state authorities over borders and the ease with which informal operators evade borders. 
In West Africa, common re-export goods  which are banned or are subject to high taxes 
in some countries within the sub-region are cars, clothes and clothing materials, 
cigarettes, sugar, rice, vegetable oil, frozen poultry etc. Significantly, Benin and Togo are 
hubs for unofficial and illegitimate cross-border trade (due to their proximity to Nigeria, 
the largest economy in the region), serving as gateway to other countries within the sub-
continent.  
Table 1 
Summary Statistics of MIMIC Estimations of Sizes of Informal Economy (as Percentages of GDP) in 
the WAMZ (1991-2015) 
Year Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria S/Leone WAMZ 
1991 50.60 46.07 41.22 42.08 56.95 38.20 45.85 
1992 49.38 46.12 41.34 43.89 58.17 41.77 46.77 
1993 49.46 47.71 41.16 44.70 58.82 43.77 47.60 
1994 53.55 46.18 41.88 45.25 66.61 43.67 49.52 
1995 56.73 44.98 41.75 45.55 62.21 44.51 49.29 
1996 55.31 46.87 42.03 46.67 61.09 46.36 49.72 
1997 54.35 44.65 41.32 45.12 60.69 46.60 48.79 
1998 51.61 45.70 39.73 45.95 62.33 45.96 48.55 
1999 48.35 44.58 40.14 44.64 59.87 48.49 47.68 
2000 45.10 41.90 39.70 43.20 57.90 48.60 46.07 
2001 43.36 42.62 39.12 42.23 57.64 50.14 45.85 
2002 51.76 42.66 38.09 41.84 59.93 47.76 47.01 
2003 42.85 42.60 39.01 43.02 57.19 45.34 45.00 
2004 38.90 42.90 28.77 42.31 56.72 43.88 42.25 
2005 45.77 43.16 37.54 42.47 55.84 43.45 44.71 
2006 48.19 41.68 37.41 39.95 51.95 42.96 43.69 
2007 47.90 41.51 38.30 42.71 54.96 40.92 44.38 
2008 45.28 41.41 38.94 43.09 53.06 40.87 43.76 
2009 39.78 40.61 42.16 43.45 53.98 40.60 43.43 
2010 35.17 40.03 43.89 41.57 52.80 39.34 42.13 
2011 48.57 40.64 39.60 41.52 51.51 36.12 42.99 
2012 42.64 40.99 37.51 42.23 51.56 32.36 41.21 
2013 40.95 39.25 38.32 42.37 51.70 25.69 39.71 
2014 43.81 38.50 38.18 42.45 50.64 26.47 40.01 
2015 43.64 39.37 41.58 43.67 52.49 34.18 42.49 
Average 46.88 42.91 39.95 43.24 56.67 41.50 45.19 
Source: Medina and Schneider (2018). Medina and Schneider (2018), in a study on ‘shadow economy’ of 158 countries of the 
world over the period between 1991 and 2015, came up with robust estimates of the 
sizes of informal economic activities of the countries covered by the research study, 
adopting the new macro methods of Currency Demand Approach (CDA) and the Multiple 
Indicator Multiple Cause (MIMIC) approach. The results of the statistical estimations of 
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the sizes of informal economies of the WAMZ, as percentages of the formal GDP, using the 
MIMIC method is as presented in Table 1 above. 
To generate these estimates, the predictor variables employed in the structural equation 
model of MIMIC were  fiscal freedom, cash (currency), unemployment, rule of law, 
corruption control, per capita income growth, labour force participation, government 
stability, and trade openness in these countries. For the WAMZ member economies, the 
inclusion of these variables are justified. All things being equal, for instant, on per capita 
growth, a bigger informal economy can be associated with more economic activities 
getting off the formal economy thus resulting in decrease in economic growth. Lower 
official labour force participation signals higher informal activities while the more the 
cash (currency) used, the greater the extent of informal economic activities. The 
possibility of increased informal economic activities could also be caused by high 
unemployment rate. Corrupt practices are always associate with unofficial/informal 
activities while good rule of law enhances formal economic activities and reduces the 
level of informal activities. 
3. Stylised Facts of Macroeconomics  
For the WAMZ countries, this section considers some macroeconomic stylised facts and 
theoretical propositions. These are: (i) some macroeconomic fluctuations in relation to 
business cycles from the view-point of the developing economies of the WAMZ and the 
developed economies of Germany, the UK and the US; (ii) international parity 
relationships ; (iii) Phillips curve; (iv) Lucas short-run output-inflation trade-off.  
3.1. Stylised Facts of Macroeconomic Fluctuations and Business Cycles 
In this study, fluctuations in macroeconomic variables were examined at the frequency 
of business cycle. This necessitated decomposing of these variables into trend (non-
stationary) and cyclical (stationary) components. The reason for this is that specific 
empirical features of these data (such cross-correlation) can only be valid if data are 
stationary. To de-trend the variables used here, and decompose these series into trend 
and cyclical components so as to remove long term trend and derive cyclical components 
which are stationary, the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filtering method (with lambda=100 for 
annual data) was applied.  The cyclical components of the variables of interest were 
applied to estimate volatility and co-movements (correlation) towards verifying the 
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relevant stylised facts. These are meant to establish pro-cyclicality, a-cyclicality and 
counter-cyclicality in these variables. Within the context of the assessment here, volatility 
was taken to be aggregate fluctuations measures by standard deviation, while co-
movement measure was by the magnitude of correlation coefficients. Positive correlation 
indicate pro-cyclicality while counter-cyclicality was deduced from negative correlation. 
Acyclicality is the situation of zero correlation. 
Six major areas of stylised facts considered here for the WAMZ countries ( as developing 
economies) and Germany, United Kingdom and the United States (as developed 
economies) are for: (1) output and income (real GDP and nominal GDP); (2) fiscal 
variables (government expenditure and revenue and fiscal impulse); (3) money and 
credit (money supply and velocity of money); (4) price (consumer price, inflation and 
nominal interest rates); (5) exchange rates (nominal US dollar exchange rates, nominal 
effective exchange rates and real effective exchange rates); and (6) foreign trade 
(merchandise trade balance). Velocity of broad money supply was derived by dividing 
nominal GDP by money supply (M3) while government expenditure was divided by 
government revenue to derive fiscal impulse. Merchandise trade balance was taken to be 
the difference between imports and exports of the countries evaluated. Variables 
evaluated were generally over the period between 1991 and 2015. 
The results of the correlation of business cycles and the cyclical component of some 
monetary and exchange rates, fiscal and external trade variables in the nine countries 
assessed are as exhibited in Table 2 below. 
Table 2: Results of Correlation of Cyclical Components of Macroeconomic Variables and Business 
Cycles in the WAMZ and Three Developed Economies 
 Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria S/Leone Germany UK US 
Government 
Expenditure 
 
0.33 
 
0.78 
 
0.19 
 
0.93 
 
0.03 
 
0.27 
 
0.14 
 
0.17 
 
0.55 
Government 
Revenue 
 
0.50 
 
0.76 
 
na 
 
0.03 
 
0.007 
 
0.69 
 
0.61 
 
0.73 
 
0.82 
Fiscal Impulse 0.19 -0.14 na -0.68 0.11 -0.09 0.13 0.05 0.11 
Broad Money 
Supply (M3) 
 
0.13 
 
0.62 
 
0.25 
 
0.41 
 
0.21 
 
0.64 
 
na 
 
0.12 
 
0.09 
Velocity of 
Money 
 
0.44 
 
0.11 
 
0.61 
 
0.66 
 
0.09 
 
0.68 
 
na 
 
0.08 
 
-
0.41 
Domestic 
Credits 
 
0.35 
 
0.31 
 
0.61 
 
0.99 
 
0.39 
 
0.30 
 
0.05 
 
0.33 
 
0.59 
Price (CPI) 0.02 0.004 0.46 0.66 0.006 0.46 0.35 0.64 0.05 
Inflation Rate 0.35 0.09 0.08 0.22 0.03 0.76 0.03 0.17 0.64 
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Nominal 
Interest Rate 
 
0.43 
 
-0.30 
 
0.19 
 
0.98 
 
-0.28 
 
-0.08 
 
0.72 
 
0.67 
 
0.55 
Nominal (USD) 
Exchange Rate 
 
0.15 
 
0.28 
 
0.20 
 
0.70 
 
0.20 
 
0.42 
 
na 
 
0.66 
 
na 
NEER 0.02 0.47 na na 0.36 0.37 0.35 0.73 0.13 
REER 0.09 0.44 na na 0.30 0.83 0.36 0.73 0.24 
Imports 0.41 0.52 0.45 0.62 0.09 0.14 0.50 0.47 0.60 
Exports 0.53 0.72 0.63 0.97 0.12 0.93 0.53 0.37 0.13 
Merchandise 
Trade balance 
 
0.47 
 
0.17 
 
0.16 
 
0.91 
 
0.12 
 
0.80 
 
0.45 
 
0.34 
 
0.83 
Source: Author’ Estimation, EIU Database and EViews 9.5Output 
 
For the fiscal variables, the results for all the WAMZ countries revealed pro-cyclicality of 
fiscal variables of government expenditure and government revenue. However, both 
variables appeared acyclical in the case of Nigeria. Similar results were obtained for the 
three developed economies assessed. Although, the economic intuition here is that fiscal 
policy should be countercyclical, there have been evidences of fiscal policy pro-cyclicality 
being a stylised fact. When the fiscal impulse measure was analysed to reveal the net 
effect of government expenditure and revenue on real output, the correlation coefficients 
were negative (counter-cyclicality) only for Ghana, Liberia and Sierra Leone while other 
WAMZ countries, Germany, UK and the US exhibited pro-cyclicality. These indicate that 
during economic boom, governments of these countries increase expenditure and reduce 
tax revenue and in recession reduce expenditure and increase revenue. The correlation 
of monetary variable (broad money) were pro-cyclical for all the countries evaluated, 
suggesting positive transmission of monetary shock to real economic activities. Pro-
cyclicality of monetary variables is, however, a stylised fact. For the evaluation of velocity 
of money, the results showed pro-cyclicality for all countries, with the exemption of the 
US. The postulation of the QTM is that, given the pro-cyclicality of broad money, velocity 
of money is expected to be counter-cyclical. However, this holds only for the US which 
tended towards a-cyclicality in broad money. There was positive correlation in the cases 
of domestic credit for all the WAMZ developing economies and the three developed 
economies. This was expected as it indicated that domestic credits were made available 
for domestic economies in these countries, though very low (and tending towards a-
cyclicality) for Nigeria. 
In literature, the results of the tests of correlation between price and output have been 
mixed. In this respect, estimations in this study yielded positive correlation of domestic 
real output and both price and inflation rates, thus depicting pro-cyclical variations of 
price in the WAMZ countries and the developed economies under assessment. These 
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showed that supply shocks dominantly influenced macroeconomic fluctuations in these 
economies. However inflation appears to be closely a-cyclical in Ghana, Guinea Nigeria 
and Germany. Nominal interest rate was expectedly pro-cyclical in the advanced 
economies of Germany, UK and the US and also in The Gambia, Guinea and Liberia. While 
the nominal US dollar exchange rate was pro-cyclical for all the countries examined; and 
both NEER and REER were equally positively correlated with domestic real output for the 
four WAMZ countries whose data for these analyses were available. This same result was 
obtained for the three developed economies examined. The positive correlations of these 
exchange rate variables are stylised facts. Nevertheless, the positive correlation for The 
Gambia in NEER and REER were low and tending towards a-cyclical status for these 
variables. For the foreign trade variables of imports and exports, the relationships with 
domestic output were positive for all the nine countries. However, merchandise trade 
balance is deemed to be an adequate measure of foreign trade transactions; and the 
correlation of this series with real domestic output for all the WAMZ countries and three 
developed countries were pro-cyclical. There might be a link between domestic output 
and exports or this might be due to the insensitivity of imports of these countries to 
fluctuations in domestic demands. This positive relationship is very strong in Liberia, 
Sierra Leone and the US. 
Table 3: Results of Volatility (Standard Deviations) of Cyclical Components of Macroeconomic 
Variables of the WAMZ and Three Developed Economies 
 Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria S/Leone Germany UK US 
Nominal 
Interest 
Rate 
 
4.34 
 
5.06 
 
2.51 
 
0.38 
 
3.11 
 
10.41 
 
1.02 
 
1.10 
 
1.42 
Nominal 
(USD) 
Exchange 
Rate 
 
3.24 
 
0.10 
 
401.74 
 
8.47 
 
15.57 
 
175.17 
 
na 
 
0.04 
 
na 
NEER 25.79 144.44 na na 113.40 66.67 2.88 7.41 0.52 
REER 13.74 13.48 na na 45.49 10.74 3.90 7.57 5.04 
Velocity of 
Money 
 
63.09 
 
8.50 
 
5.05 
 
26.39 
 
10.63 
 
30.13 
 
na 
 
2.11 
 
1.67 
Price (CPI) 2.76 4.06 4.49 2.54 2.59 2.27 0.86 1.10 0.76 
Inflation 
Rate 
20.50 13.69 7.72 6.17 68.56 19.19 0.72 1.56 0.52 Source: Author’ Estimation and EViews 9.5Output 
Table 3 above highlights the results of the assessment of the stylised facts on the volatility 
of cyclical components of seven selected macroeconomic variables estimated for the 
WAMZ countries and the developed economies of Germany, the UK and the US. In this 
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context, it is a stylised fact that the cycles of macroeconomic variables are more volatile 
in developing economies than in developed economies. 
It is apparent and clear from the results displayed above that variabilities of the 
macroeconomic series examined were lower in the developed economies of Germany, the 
UK and the US than the developing economies of the WAMZ, thus supporting this stylised 
fact. 
On the overall, results generated through estimations and analyses here were mixed, 
however, there some appreciable volumes of supports for the stylised fact assessed in 
this sub-section. 
3.2. International Parity Relationships – PPP, IFE and UIP 
Parity condition gives intuitive explanations of the movements in price and interest rates 
in different markets in relation to exchange rate. Theoretically, exchange rate (spot and 
forward) are influenced by interest rates and inflation. Therefore, international parity 
conditions (which are core to international finance) are economic theories linking 
exchange rate, price levels and interest rates together. They are key relations applied in 
predicting movements in exchange rates. Four (4) parity conditions exhibiting 
interlinkages are: (i) Relative Purchasing Power Parity, (ii) Fisher Effect (close); (iii) 
International Fisher Effect (open); and (iv) Interest Rate Parity. Commodity market 
inflation (changes in price level) affect market interest rate which in turn, through 
interest rate parity, affect exchange rates. Though, to some degree, these theories 
logically explain exchange rate fluctuations, however, they are not too strong as they 
based on some assumptions that could be challenged. Some of these assumptions are: 
free flow of goods, services and capital which do not hold true in the real world. 
Nevertheless, parity conditions are expected to hold in the long run, but not always in the 
short run.  
The law of one price (LOOP) states that in a competitive market (free of transportation 
costs and official trade barriers – tariffs), identical goods sold in different countries must 
sell for same price when their prices are expressed in terms of the same currency. This 
law buttresses the important principle in trade theory that in a situation of ‘open trade’ and ‘costless trade’, identical goods must trade at same relative prices regardless of 
where they are sold (Krugman, Obstfeld and Melitz, 2015). The tendency of identical 
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goods to sell for identical prices globally generates a link between exchange rate and 
prices. As prices change globally, it is necessary to exchange rate to also change in order 
to keep the prices measured in a common currency equal across countries. This 
adjustment of exchange rate to offset differing inflation rates between countries is the 
reason for exchange rate changes (Husted and Melvin, 2013). This relationship between 
exchange rate and price level is the purchasing power parity (PPP) which explains the 
movement in the exchange rate between currencies of two countries by price level 
changes in these countries. 
Purchasing Power Parity: The PPP theory states that the exchange rate between two countries’ currencies equals the ratio of the countries’ price levels. The prediction of PPP 
is that an increase (decrease) in the purchasing power of the domestic currency (as 
depicted by decrease (increase) in the domestic price level) will be associated with a 
proportional currency appreciation (depreciation) in the foreign exchange market. The 
PPP theory can be expressed in an equation as: 𝐸 = 𝑃 − 𝑃∗                                                                          1 
where 𝐸 is exchange rate, 𝑃 and 𝑃∗ are price levels in the domestic and foreign countries 
respectively. The assertion of PPP is that there is equality in price levels of all countries 
when measures in terms of same currency.2  
Although, the PPP equation may reflect the idea of LOOP, they are however, different. 
While LOOP applies to the individual commodity, PPP relates to the general price level. 
For every commodity, if LOOP hold true, PPP must hold automatically so far the reference 
basket of goods that estimates price levels in different countries are the same. An 
affirmation of PPP is that even when the LOOP is true literally, economic forces behind it 
will assist it to equalise purchasing powers in all countries (Krugman et al, 2015). 
There is absolute PPP and there is relative PPP. Absolute PPP (which is the strong-form-
PPP) is the expression in Equation 3.1 that exchange rate is equal to relative price levels 
where the variables involved are transformed into logarithmic forms. This version of PPP 
holds that by comparing prices of a bundle of goods in two different countries (with 
                                                          
2 This is a crucial assertion for an economic bloc aiming at monetary integration and a common currency. 
15 | P a g e  
 
conversions by exchange rate into a common currency measure), the price will then be 
equal.  
Drawing from Equation 1, the algebraic expression of the absolute PPP is: 𝐸 = 𝑃𝑃∗                                                                                   2 
where the variables are not transformed into logarithm. Relative PPP (which is the weak-
form PPP) states that the percentage change in the exchange rate between two currencies 
over a period of time equals to the difference between the percentage changes in national 
price levels. What this denotes is that that relative PPP begins with absolute PPP and then 
transform Equation 2 into percentage changes thus: %∆𝐸 = %∆𝑃 − %∆𝑃∗                                                                        3 
Relative PPP accounts for market imperfections. As acknowledged by the proponents of 
the PPP theory, the absolute PPP is not likely to hold because of the existence of transport 
costs, trade impediments, distortion effects of tariffs, quotas and protections, imperfect 
information and competition etc., while it is argued that relative PPP can hold even in the 
presence of these highlighted problems. The argument of relative PPP is that exchange 
rate will adjust by the amount of inflation differentials between two economies. In the 
consideration of market imperfection, relative PPP, which is the long run path on which 
exchange rate moves with inflation is tested in this chapter. 
Many empirical studies have reached the conclusion that PPP hold better in the long run 
than in the short run and that there can be prolonged and substantial deviations in the 
long run (Ardeni and Lubian, 1991). On the overall, it was argued that PPP holds better 
for traded goods than for non-traded goods (Officer, 1976). A stylised fact and major 
empirical regularity is that non-traded goods are usually more expensive in rich countries 
than in poor countries once the prices are converted into a common currency (Pilbeam, 
2018). This is a vital point. Furthermore, the PPP theory holds better for relatively high 
inflation countries and underdeveloped capital markets. High-inflation countries’ 
currencies (relative to their trade partners) tend to experience rapid depreciation that 
reflects such high inflation, thus suggesting that PPP is a dominant foreign exchange rate 
determinant in such countries.  PPP may not hold generally because of confounding 
effects through other factors that are determinants of exchange rate. 
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Husted and Melvin (2013) stressed that developing economies have very low prices for many goods and services when measured in terms of developed countries’ currencies 
(such as the US dollar). In these developing economies, when overall economic activities 
are measured at market exchange rate, domestic products are understated. Furthermore, 
common findings show that PPP holds better for countries having high trade openness 
and perform poorly for countries with significant trade barriers. Because of the 
postulation that PPP holds better when countries concerned are geographically close and 
trade linkages are high (according to Frankel, 1981), in testing the validity of 
international parity relationships, this study generates thirty (30) pairs of bilateral 
nominal exchange rates in which all the six WAMZ countries, each serves as home 
economies to each other five member countries.  
Because price level data are non-existing, the available consumer price indices (which is 
index numbers whose value is 100 during the base year of the data) are commonly used. 
For both domestic and foreign countries, consumer price index (CPI) are constructed as: 𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑡 = 𝑃𝑡𝑃0                                                                                   4 
where 𝑃𝑡  and 𝑃0 are the consumer price level at time t and the base year respectively. If the home country’s CPI is divided by foreign country’s CPI, this results into: 𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑡𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑡∗ = (𝑃𝑡𝑃𝑡∗) 𝑋 (𝑃0∗𝑃0)                                                               5 
where ∗ depicts the foreign country. Assuming the absolute PPP in Equation 2 holds in 
the base year, the actual exchange rate in the base year equals to the PPP exchange rate 
for the base year. An empirical measure of PPP exchange rate by cross multiplying terms 
in Equation 5 thus: 𝐸𝑡 = 𝐸𝑡𝑃𝑃𝑃 = 𝐸0 (𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑡𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑡∗)                                                                          6 
 As a commonly used technique which involves the correlation of the actual exchange 
rates movements and the PPP counterpart, Equation 3.6 allows for the test of the validity 
of PPP (Husted and Melvin, 2013). This PPP exchange rate which re-establishes PPP 
relative to the base period offsets the relative inflation between a pair of countries, in 
consideration of the base period. 
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A further way of assessing long run PPP is to investigate the stationarity of real exchange 
rate (RER). The assumptions of absolute PPP is that RER is constant. The RER is nominal 
exchange rate adjusted for national prices. If the RER is stationary, any percentage change 
in price levels would be offset by equal magnitude of nominal exchange rate 
depreciation/appreciation. If RER contains unit roots, this then means that RER shocks 
are permanent with a further implication that PPP does not hold. For this purpose, 
bilateral RER were estimated for the WAMZ countries as: 𝑞 = 𝑠 ( 𝑝𝑝∗)                                                                              7 
where 𝑞 is real exchange rate. 
Here, PPP is tested under the null hypothesis that RER is a random walk (that is, RER 
contains unit root and not stationary) against the alternative hypothesis that RER is 
stationary (Messe and Rogoff, 1988 and Mark, 1989). Although, the unit root tests of RER were performed ‘with and without time trend’, it is more appropriate to apply the model 
without trend in determining the stationarity of RER. This is because the inclusion of 
linear time trend is not theoretically consistent with long run proposition of PPP. Some 
empirical studies also suggested the inconsistency of time trend in RER with the PPP 
hypothesis (Culver and Papell, 1999; Holmes, 2002; Zhang and Lowinger, 2006; Acaravci 
and Acaravci, 2007) 
International Fisher Effect:  According to the Quantity Theory of Money (QTM), in the long 
run, money supply growth causes changes in price, while it is a general consensus among 
economists that money supply growth does not affect real variables in the long run. 
Consequently, real interest rate should not be impacted by money supply growth. If this 
holds, all inflation changes must be reflected in the nominal interest rate. The 
explanations of the ‘Fisher Effect’ is on how the nominal interest rate is affected by 
changes in inflation, in response to money supply growth. This thus reflects the effect of 
money supply growth on the nominal interest rate as clearly expressed in the QTM and 
Fisher equation. Fisher effect is therefore an expression that allows for the impact of 
inflation on nominal interest rate, in which increasing inflationary expectations causes 
increasing nominal interest. The Fisher equation is expressed as: 𝑟 = 𝑖 − 𝜋𝑒                                                                                       8 
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Where 𝑟 is real interest rate, 𝑖 is nominal interest rate and 𝜋𝑒  is expected inflation. ‘Fisher Effect’ depicts one-to-one relationship between nominal interest rate and inflation rate. 
This was brought to the fore by Irving Fisher who theorised a direct relationship between 
inflation rate and nominal interest rate. According to this postulation, all things being equal, a rise in a country’s expected inflation rate will eventually cause an equal rise in 
interest rate, and vice versa. A currency with high rate of inflation should also bear 
interest rate higher than a currency with lower rates of inflation. This is the one-to-one 
relationship between nominal interest rate and inflation in ‘Fisher Effect’ expressed thus: 𝑖 = 𝜋𝑒                                                                                  9 
 
This Fisher effect for a domestic economy while the foreign version of this equation can 
be stated as: 𝑖∗ = 𝜋𝑒∗                                                                            10 
From the UIP condition and the Fisher hypothesis, there is a theoretical suggestion that 
currencies with higher interest rates depreciate because higher nominal interest rate 
reflects higher expected inflation. This is what the international Fisher effect (IFE) 
suggests. In order to clearly understand how relative nominal exchange rates changes among countries affect a country’s currency, it is necessary to recollect and consider the 
implications of the theories of PPP and Fisher effect. The implication of PPP is that 
exchange rate will move in order to offset changes in inflation rate differential. Therefore, 
a rise in a domestic inflation rate relative to that of a foreign country should associate with a fall in the value of the home country’s currency. Secondly, this should also associate with a rise in the domestic country’s interest rate. When these two conditions are put 
together, there will be IFE which is also known as Fisher effect (open). It can therefore be 
stated that IFE equals to the combination of the PPP and Fisher effect (closed).  
International Fisher Effect (IFE) hypothesises that interest rate differentials in based on 
inflation differences. The higher the interest rate, the higher the inflation rate which 
subjects a currency to the weaker condition of depreciation. IFE therefore portends that 
differences in nominal interest rate between two countries should be proportional to 
depreciation or appreciation of the currencies of the two countries. The international 
Fisher effect (IFE) is an economic and exchange rate model applied in predicting nominal 
exchange rate movements between two or more foreign currencies based on the 
relationship between the prevailing interest rate in these countries. 
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Just like the PPP theory, IFE conjectures that interest rate differentials (and not inflation 
differential) influences exchange rate changes. IFE also states that an estimated change 
in the current exchange rate between any two currencies is directly proportional to the 
difference between the nominal interest rate of these two countries as a particular time. 
As earlier indicated, there is the hypothesis is that the real interest rate in an economy is 
independent of monetary variables and with the assumption that rates are calculated 
across countries, it can be inferred that a country experiencing lower (higher) interest 
rate will also experience lower (higher). Consequently, IFE estimated exchange rate are 
equally based on nominal interest rates relationships. If IFE theory explains the 
relationship between interest rates and exchange rate, it impliedly proposes interest rate 
differential as a prediction of the future changes in spot exchange rate. 
Automatically, nominal interest rate differentials reflects inflation differential by a no-
arbitrage system or by a PPP. This depicts that there is close relationship between PPP 
and IFE due to the high degree of correlation between interest rate and inflation rate. 
What IFE is therefore saying is that the currency of a country reflecting lower (higher) 
interest rate should experience appreciation (depreciation) relative to the currency of 
the country bearing higher (lower) interest rate. These show that there is proportional 
relationship between depreciation/appreciation of currency, prices and nominal interest 
rate differential. This link between interest rate, inflation and exchange rate is provided 
by IFE. 
However, the validity of IFE depends largely on capital market integration which implies 
free flows of capital across markets. This is however problematic in developing 
economies like the WAMZ economies (unlike developed economies). Given the foregoing 
explanations, international Fisher Effect can be expressed as: %∆𝑒 = (1+𝑖𝑑1+𝑖𝑓) − 1                                                                     11 
or %∆𝑒 = (𝑖𝑑−𝑖𝑓1+𝑖𝑓 )                                                                          12 
where ∆𝑒 is the percentage change in exchange rate, 𝑖𝑑 and 𝑖𝑓 are the domestic and foreign 
nominal interest rates respectively. ∆𝑒 will be positive if 𝑖𝑑 > 𝑖𝑓, implying that domestic 
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currency will depreciate relative to the foreign currency due to high inflationary 
expectations in the domestic country. On the other hand, if 𝑖𝑑 < 𝑖𝑓, ∆𝑒 will be negative. 
These therefore connote positive relationship between exchange rate changes and 
interest rate differentials. 
The position of IFE is that the nominal exchange rate between two countries should 
adjust for nominal interest rate differentials. These adjustment can occur either through 
(i) international capital flow (international money market) or trade and flow of goods. 
Therefore, free capital mobility is a condition for IFE to hold. Because the IFE theory is 
based on the PPP theory, the IFE theory might not hold due to the same reason that 
caused the PPP theory not to hold in the presence of other factors (other than inflation) 
affecting exchange rate movements and thus prevent exchange rate from adjusting 
according to the dictates of inflation differentials 
Going by the foregoing analyses and the interconnectivity of the parity conditions and 
with the consideration of model Equations 9 and 10 above, IFE can be expressed and 
estimated as the relationship between relative nominal interest rates and relative 
inflation thus: (𝑖 − 𝑖∗) = (𝜋 − 𝜋∗)                                                                 13 
where * indicate the foreign variables. 
Interest rates parity is state that interest rate differential between two countries is equal 
to the difference between the spot and forward exchange rates. The covered interest rate 
parity (CIP) is a condition that the price of risk-free asset having an identical maturity 
should be equal across countries after being translated into a common currency. This is 
arbitrage condition. The uncovered interest rate parity (UIP) occurs when the difference 
between interest rates equals to the difference in the spot exchange rate. If IFE states that 
change in exchange rates have to do with expected differences in interest rate, which 
means that the market will react in trying to achieve the UIP. 
Uncovered interest rate parity (UIP) states that exchange rate will change at a rate that 
offsets the interest rate differential. The UIP condition is such that expected rate of 
depreciation or appreciation of an exchange rate is equal to the interest rate differential 
between two the countries affected. Thus, UIP is expressed as: 
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%∆𝐸 = 𝑖 − 𝑖∗                                                                       14 
Where ∆𝐸 is the expected rate of depreciation or appreciation of the domestic country’s 
currency in a direct quotation system while 𝑖 and 𝑖∗ are the domestic and foreign interest 
rates respectively. Higher interest rate is expected to cause depreciation while low 
interest rate leads to currency appreciation. What UIP says is that expected change in 
foreign exchange price offsets the difference in the nominal rates of returns. 
Nevertheless, UIP does not imply CIP. The requirements of UIP goes beyond friction-free 
financial markets. Investors may be indifferent about currency denomination of their 
financial assets so far these assets have same expected returns, even regardless of the 
volatility of these returns. Specifically, the investor may care less about currency risks involved. Such risk neutrality stance denotes ‘perfect substitutability’ of financial assets 
which is the implication of the UIP. Therefore, UIP is a relationship that must hold when 
domestic and foreign financial assets are perfect substitute in the situation of capital 
mobility. This is an assumption of monetary models of exchange rate determination. 
Suppose an investor within the WAMZ is considering buying an assets denominated in a 
foreign currency within the region has options of investing this fund in either Nigerian 
bonds or Ghanaian bonds having same risk and maturity postures. With these options 
before the investor, he/she should therefore bear two factors in mind: (i) the interest rate 
on the Nigerian bonds and the Ghanaian bonds; and (ii) the expectation of what happens 
to the naira-cedi exchange rate.  Because these bonds have equal risks, he/she can 
instantaneously switch between the two bonds. What make the difference between the 
two financial assets in this case is the currencies in which they are denominated and the 
related interest rates. If such international investor is a Nigerian who is contemplating 
the purchase of a Ghanaian bond while expecting the Nigerian currency (naira) to 
depreciate (lose its value) against the Ghanaian currency (cedi) as he holds the bonds, 
this will cause a rise in his expected Nigerian naira returns from holding the Ghanaian 
bond. These are the ideas of UIP. The real return from holding the Nigerian (domestic) 
interest bearing asset is the difference between interest rate and inflation (𝑖 − 𝜋). 
Therefore, this real return from domestic interest bearing assets is transformed into the 
deviation of domestic inflation from the sum of foreign inflation and expected exchange 
rate appreciation/depreciation (𝑖∗ + ∆𝐸 − 𝜋). This is what UIP entails. 
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Data and Methods: To serve as a precursor to the empirical assessments of exchange rate 
determination in the WAMZ countries, efforts in this section was limited to the test for 
the validity of the Absolute and Relative PPP as well as the IFE postulations. 
Investigations of simultaneous validity of these theories in the cases of the six WAMZ 
countries were performed. In these respects, these necessitated the investigation of both 
directions of bilateral relationship of the six countries of the WAMZ in which these countries at one point or the other, serve as ‘domestic country/currency’ against respective ‘foreign country/currency’. These constitute thirty pairs or bilateral 
relationships.  
Quarterly data of money market interest rates, consumer price index (CPI) for a period 
of 21 years between 1995 and 2015 were sourced from the databases of World Bank, IMF 
and EIU and applied for this study. For the WAMZ countries assessed, absolute PPP 
should imply cointegration between the nominal exchange rates and relative foreign and 
domestic prices; relative PPP should connote cointegration of changes in nominal interest 
rates and changes in relative foreign and domestic prices; while IFE should require 
cointegration between nominal interest rate differentials and inflation differentials.  As 
an initial step, Equation 7 was estimated to generate the PPP exchange rates for the 
WAMZ countries in order to investigate the levels of equality of PPP exchange rates and 
market exchange rates of the WAMZ and further establish the degree of deviations (if 
any) of these rates from each other and as well establish the degree of association 
(correlation) of these two exchange rates over the 15-year period (between 2001 and 
2015) covered by the validity tests. For the purpose of the cointegration estimations, the 
Augmented Dicky-Fuller (ADF) and Phillip-Perron (PP) unit root tests were performed at 
the first stage to check for the order of integration of the variables employed in the 
cointegration analyses because residual-based cointegration tests require all variables 
(at least the dependent variable) to be to an integration order of one. Fully modified least 
square (FMOLS) cointegrating regression were performed for each of the 30 bilateral 
relationships and the residuals of these FMOLS estimation results were tested for unit 
root/stationarity under the residual-based single equation cointegration methods which 
require the residuals to be stationary if the variables are cointegrated to be The 
econometric variants of Residual-based cointegration tests (Phillips Ouliaris and Park’s 
Added Variables Tests) and the statistical methods of Pearson Moment Correlation and 
were appropriately applied. While Phillips Ouliaris tests the null hypothesis of no 
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cointegration against the alternative hypothesis of cointegration, Parks’ Added Variable 
Tests were applied to test null hypothesis of no cointegration.  The cointegration tests 
were performed at 1% level of significance. 
Results and Findings: The deviations of the estimated annual PPP exchange rates and 
market exchange bilateral exchange cross-rates across the WAMZ countries as well as the 
results of estimates of the strength of association of these two forms of exchange rates 
over a period of fifteen years are exhibited in Table 4 below.  
Table 4 
Deviations of PPP Exchange Rates from Market Exchange Rates and Correlation Estimates in the 
WAMZ (2001-2015) 
 Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria S/Leone 
2001 0.22 -2.68 na 12.50 45.51 na 
2002 0.23 0.27 na 21.21 47.55 na 
2003 0.17 6.05 na 15.64 47.80 na 
2004 0.13 5.02 118.72 8.97 41.69 na 
2005 0.06 3.22 943.99 7.85 27.31 na 
2006 0.00 3.00 1625.19 6.81 19.64 -129.89 
2007 -0.04 -0.80 -10.69 5.81 14.12 -371.06 
2008 -0.03 -3.63 -196.23 0.46 -1.46 -515.84 
2009 0.09 -0.45 -239.52 0.64 14.56 -386.34 
2010 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
2011 0.00 1.00 -77.93 -2.86 -6.75 231.03 
2012 0.21 3.01 -618.34 -5.08 -20.05 43.58 
2013 0.21 5.67 -1477.43 -5.81 -32.50 -139.75 
2014 0.91 10.16 -2038.88 -5.83 -43.29 -81.14 
2015 1.35 8.82 -2293.78 -10.20 -27.33 173.00 
% Correlation 95.98% 96.65% 94.06% 96.45% 90.11% 96.72% Source: Author’s Estimations  
The Pearson Product-moment correlation estimation of the degrees of association of the 
two classes of exchange rate (reported in percentage translations of the correlation 
coefficients) were very high (at over 90 percentages) and positivity moved towards same 
direction. These portend close linear association of the market exchange rates and the 
PPP theoretically predisposed exchange rates across the WAMZ. 
Regarding the investigations of the PPP (absolute and relative) and IFE, results of the 
various unit roots tests of variables employed in the tests of validity of the international 
parity conditions are reported in Tables 5-8 below. 
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Table 5  
Results of ADF and PP Unit Roots Tests of Cross Exchange Rates 
  ADF PP 
Home 
Country 
Foreign 
Country 
With Constant With Constant 
& Trend 
With Constant With Constant 
& Trend 
GAMBIA Ghana 
Guinea 
Liberia 
Nigeria 
S/Leone 
-4.253 
-1.280 
-1.813 
-2.031 
-3.536* 
-4.192* 
-3.034 
-2.275 
-2.012 
-3.429*** 
-4.871* 
-1.359 
-1.698 
-2.051 
-3.004** 
-3.867** 
-2.115 
-2.308 
-2.079 
-2.728 
GHANA Gambia 
Guinea 
Liberia 
Nigeria 
S/Leone 
0.274 
-1.185 
-1.478 
-0.006 
-0.073 
-1.499 
-1.018 
-0.401 
-1.128 
-1.666 
-0.796 
-1.185 
1.309 
-0.206 
-0.399 
-0.857 
-1.018 
-0.635 
-1.447 
-1.540 
GUINEA Gambia 
Ghana 
Liberia 
Nigeria 
S/Leone 
-1.093 
-1.765 
-1.204 
-1.655 
-1.986 
-1.535 
-1.517 
-1.484 
-2.044 
-1.987 
-1.209 
-1.483 
-1.271 
-1.396 
-1.851 
-1.768 
-1.421 
-1.484 
-1.481 
-1.609 
LIBERIA Gambia 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Nigeria 
S/Leone 
-1.698 
-7.720* 
-1.850 
-1.800 
-2.681*** 
-2.009 
-6.356 
-2.783 
-1.659 
-2.584 
-1.572 
-6.441* 
-1.187 
-1.775 
-3.456* 
-1.826 
-3.621** 
-1.864 
-1.573 
-2.428 
NIGERIA Gambia 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Liberia 
S/Leone 
-2.085 
-2.459 
-1.683 
-1.932 
-2.150 
-1.988 
-3.840*** 
-1.075 
-1.913 
-2.126 
-2.248 
-2.460 
-1.182 
-1.899 
-2.211 
-2.173 
-3.084 
-1.198 
-1.925 
-2.189 
SIERRA Gambia 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Liberia 
Nigeria 
-2.730*** 
-1.802 
-2.213 
-1.846 
-2.577 
-2.698 
-3.087 
-1.330 
-3.952** 
-2.711 
-2.436 
-1.539 
-2.180 
-1.794 
-2.771*** 
-2.372 
-2.499 
-1.608 
-2.664 
-2.920 Source: Author’s Estimations and EViews 10 
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Table 6 
Results of ADF and PP Unit Roots Tests of Absolute PPP Term (P-P*) 
  ADF PP 
Home 
Country 
Foreign 
Country 
With Constant With Constant 
& Trend 
With Constant With Constant 
& Trend 
GAMBIA Ghana 
Guinea 
Liberia 
Nigeria 
S/Leone 
-2.704* 
-7.200* 
-0.498 
-3.518* 
-1.824 
-4.723* 
-5.171* 
-3.913*** 
-7.093* 
-0.041 
-11.524* 
-5.688 
-1.402 
-8.940 
-3.792 
-9.780* 
-2.556 
-2.453 
-20.828* 
-1.777 
GHANA Gambia 
Guinea 
Liberia 
Nigeria 
S/Leone 
0.995 
-4.579 
-0.395 
-0.968 
0.373 
-2.782 
-3.143 
-3.311*** 
-1.400 
-3.228*** 
1.268 
-3.257** 
0.715 
-0.505 
1.194 
-2.053 
-1.694 
-3.549** 
-2.040 
-0.835 
GUINEA Gambia 
Ghana 
Liberia 
Nigeria 
S/Leone 
-2.108 
-3.049 
-1.870 
-2.898*** 
-0.590 
-1.496 
-1.912 
-3.444*** 
-1.350 
2.165 
-1.793 
-2.426 
-1.943 
-2.629*** 
1.758 
-0.869 
-1.125 
-1.551 
-1.492 
-2.161 
LIBERIA Gambia 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Nigeria 
S/Leone 
-0.190 
-1.845 
-3.312** 
-1.605 
-1.658 
-3.255 
-4.092** 
-1.827 
-2.814 
-3.329* 
-0.715 
-0.653 
-3.427 
-1.406 
-1.577 
-2.511 
-2.957 
-1.815 
-2.837 
-3.545** 
NIGERIA Gambia 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Liberia 
S/Leone 
-1.735 
-2.595** 
-4.697* 
-1.564 
-3.471 
-3.079 
1.773 
-3.051 
-2.852 
-0.489 
-1.678 
-1.043 
-4.489* 
-1.369 
0.281 
-3.133 
-1.524 
-2.307 
-2.880 
-2.541 
SIERRA Gambia 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Liberia 
Nigeria 
-1.712 
-0.930 
-1.156 
-2.135 
-4.247 
-0.149 
-5.532 
-0.904 
-3.594 
-0.796 
-3.389** 
-0.338 
-3.525** 
-1.866 
0.241 
 
-1.815* 
-4.184 
-3.269*** 
-2.126 Source: Author’s Estimations and EViews 10 
 Virtually all the WAMZ countries’ variables for the cointegration tests of relative PPP 
were stationary, and this makes cointegration tests inappropriate in these respects. 
Consequently, this study resorted to the application of the Pearson Product-Moment 
correlation estimations of the terms of relative PPP for the 30 bilateral relationship 
across the WAMZ in order to establish the strength of linear association between 
percentages changes in exchange rates and percentage changes in inflation differentials. 
The stronger the association of these two variables of relative PPP, the closer the Pearson 
correlation coefficient will be to either +1 or -1 depending on whether the relationship is 
positive or negative, respectively. 
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Table 7 
Results of ADF and PP Unit Roots Tests of Real Exchange Rates 
  ADF  PP 
Home 
Country 
Foreign 
Country 
With Constant With Constant 
& Trend 
With Constant With Constant 
& Trend 
GAMBIA Ghana 
Guinea 
Liberia 
Nigeria 
S/Leone 
-8.059* 
-6.448* 
-1.847 
-7.032* 
-2.554 
-4.493* 
-4.457* 
-3.468*** 
-5.886* 
-2.459 
-15.018* 
-7.897* 
-1.881 
-6.948* 
-2.306 
11.576* 
-5.285* 
-2.190 
-5.816* 
-2.010 
GHANA Gambia 
Guinea 
Liberia 
Nigeria 
S/Leone 
3.441 
-3.918* 
2.876 
0.743 
0.473 
2.108 
-4.564* 
0.395 
 
1.935 
4.033 
-2.519 
3.017 
1.485 
0.872 
2.173 
-2.308 
0.305 
-0.511 
-1.059 
GUINEA Gambia 
Ghana 
Liberia 
Nigeria 
S/Leone 
-1.847 
-2.414 
-2.086 
-2.523 
-1.785 
-1.499 
-2.525 
-1.527 
-2.342 
-2.492 
-1.824 
-1.908 
2.060 
-2.337 
-2.028 
-1.648 
-1.837 
-1.527 
-1.555 
-2.103 
LIBERIA Gambia 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Nigeria 
S/Leone 
-1.863 
-1.658 
-4.940* 
-2.805** 
-3.313** 
-2.069 
-5.991* 
-3.420** 
-3.221** 
3.416** 
-1.951 
-0.243 
-5.035* 
-2.850* 
-2.181 
-2.158 
-3.704** 
-3.457** 
-3.282*** 
-2.193 
NIGERIA Gambia 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Liberia 
S/Leone 
-1.585 
-2.390 
-6.589* 
-3.044** 
-2.871*** 
-2.175 
-3.900** 
-8.228* 
-3.380** 
4.800** 
-1.619 
-2.357 
-7.269* 
-3.032*** 
1.950 
-2.295 
-3.076 
-4.932* 
-3.435*** 
-2.401 
SIERRA Gambia 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Liberia 
Nigeria 
-2.361 
-1.334 
-2.221 
-3.458** 
-2.743** 
-2.312 
-2.973 
-3.614** 
3.540** 
3.894** 
-2.050 
-0.580 
2.815*** 
-2.156 
-1.966 
-1.950 
-1.908 
-3.498*** 
-2.101 
-2.401 Source: Author’s Estimations and EViews 10 
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Table 8 
Results of ADF Unit Roots Tests (Exchange Rates Changes/CPI Differentials and IFE Terms) 
 Exchange Rate CPI Differentials IFE Terms 
Home 
Country 
Foreign 
Country 
With 
Constant 
With 
Constant 
& Trend 
With 
Constant 
With 
Constant 
& Trend 
With 
Constant 
With 
Constant 
& Trend 
GAMBIA Ghana 
Guinea 
Liberia 
Nigeria 
S/Leone 
US 
-5.700* 
-6.366* 
-4.880* 
-8.426* 
-6.266* 
-6.000* 
-5.704* 
-6.305* 
-5.022* 
-8.392* 
-2.666* 
-5.972* 
-2.396 
-4.524* 
-3.119** 
-6.038* 
-3.708* 
-2.584 
-6.149* 
-3.157*** 
-6.303* 
-3.637** 
-2.358 
-2.022 
-0.683 
-2.324 
1.801 
-2.660 
-1.665 
-2.308 
-2.756 
1.435 
GHANA Gambia 
Guinea 
Liberia 
Nigeria 
S/Leone 
US 
-5.712* 
-6.042* 
7.262* 
-6.896* 
-5.375* 
4.054* 
-5.712* 
-6.153* 
-7.345* 
-6.860* 
-5.337* 
-4.110* 
-2.396 
-4.912* 
-4.054* 
-8.717* 
-2.243 
-2.584 
-5.845* 
-3.050* 
-8.822* 
-2.204 
-2.223 
-1.837 
-2.887** 
-3.662* 
0.511 
-3.062 
-0.185 
-3.222*** 
-3.636 
0.100 
GUINEA Gambia 
Ghana 
Liberia 
Nigeria 
S/Leone 
US 
-5.819* 
-5.249* 
-7.429* 
-5.602* 
-5.617* 
-5.991* 
-5.768* 
-5.409* 
-7.468* 
-5.708* 
-5.767* 
-6.141* 
-4.524* 
-4.912* 
-6.925* 
-4.651* 
-2.022 
-6.149* 
-5.845* 
-7.756* 
-5.613* 
-2.157 
-0.705 
-1.992 
-1.535 
-2.900** 
-2.631*** 
-0.496 
-1.866 
-0.441 
-2.945 
-3.693** 
LIBERIA Gambia 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Nigeria 
S/Leone 
US 
-5.344* 
-5.154* 
-7.238* 
-8.599* 
-2.406 
-5.687* 
-5.401* 
-5.318* 
-7.192* 
-8.590* 
-2.314* 
-5.717* 
-3.119** 
-4.054* 
-6.925* 
-7.467 
-3.048** 
-3.157*** 
-3.051 
-7.756* 
-7.399* 
-3.224*** 
 
-0.753 
-2.087 
-2.527 
-4.146* 
-0.401 
-1.806 
-2.192 
-1.346 
-4.352* 
-0.378 
NIGERIA Gambia 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Liberia 
S/Leone 
US 
-9.060* 
-8.829* 
-6.223* 
-8.983* 
-9.031* 
-9.056* 
-9.074* 
-8.820* 
-6.283* 
-9.038* 
-9.015* 
-9.086* 
-6.038* 
-8.717* 
-4.651* 
-7.467* 
-3.693* 
-6.030* 
-8.822* 
-5.613* 
-7.399* 
-3.057 
-1.779 
-4.036* 
-1.450 
-2.617*** 
-0.928 
-2.120 
-4.076* 
-1.075 
-2.964 
1.378 
SIERRA Gambia 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Liberia 
Nigeria 
US 
-5.935* 
-5.704* 
-6.156* 
-2.159 
-7.495* 
-6.419* 
-5.963* 
-5.673* 
-6.235* 
-6.182* 
-7.480* 
-6.714* 
-3.708* 
-2.243 
-2.022 
-3.048** 
-3.693* 
 
-3.637** 
-2.204 
-2.158 
-3.224*** 
-3.057 
-2.781*** 
-3.051** 
-1.755 
-1.802 
-2.410 
-3.060 
-2.955 
-2.358 
-1.493 
-2.320 Source: Author’s Estimations and EViews 10 Output 
The outcome of the Phillips-Ouliaris and Park’s Added variable residual-based 
cointegration tests for absolute PPP across the WAMZ are highlighted in Table 9 below. 
For most bilateral absolute PPP relationships (except for The Gambia/Sierra Leone and 
Nigeria/Liberia). The test statistics (tau and z) yielded by the Phillip-Ouliaris tests failed 
to reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration (that is, unit roots in the residuals) at 1% 
level of significance. 
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Apart from The Gambia/Ghana and Sierra Leone/Guinea relationships, the chi-square statistics produced for all the WAMZ countries revealed that the Park’s Added Variable 
tests reject the null hypothesis of cointegration of the series at 1% level of significance. 
These two residual based cointegration tests consequently provided evidence to suggest 
that the absolute PPP does not hold across the WAMZ. 
Table 9 
Results of Residual-based Cointegration Tests of Absolute PPP in the WAMZ  
 Phillips-Oualiaris Tests Park’s Added Variable 
Tests 
Home 
Country 
Foreign 
Country 
 
tau-statistics 
 
z-statistics 
 
Chi-square 
GAMBIA Ghana 
Guinea 
Liberia 
Nigeria 
S/Leone 
-2.587 
-2.631 
-2.450 
-2.750 
-2.336 
-12.845 
-9.963 
-9.635 
-12.999 
-10.365* 
4.361 
95.023* 
133.507* 
14.341* 
12.748* 
GHANA Gambia 
Guinea 
Liberia 
Nigeria 
S/Leone 
-1.756 
-0.682 
-1.766 
-1.222 
-2.213 
-9.396 
-2.126 
-6.416 
-4.560 
-8.730 
23.709* 
185.207* 
76.931* 
25.446* 
32.718* 
GUINEA Gambia 
Ghana 
Liberia 
Nigeria 
S/Leone 
-2.205 
-1.568 
-2.693 
-2.816 
-2.857 
-7.813 
-5.824 
-12.656 
-15.684*** 
-15.327*** 
76.586* 
99.751* 
20.389* 
9.118* 
7.328** 
LIBERIA Gambia 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Nigeria 
S/Leone 
-8.634 
-3.218*** 
-3.111 
-3.827** 
-1.812 
-2.270 
-14.280 
-13.590 
-21.751** 
-6.325 
113.668* 
52.801* 
33.036* 
14.939* 
21.964* 
NIGERIA Gambia 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Liberia 
S/Leone 
-2.199 
-3.323*** 
-3.169*** 
-4.159* 
-2.735 
-8.990 
-20.677** 
-16.066*** 
-24.895* 
-12.381 
10.900* 
10.627* 
8.900* 
13.671* 
6.387** 
SIERRA Gambia 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Liberia 
Nigeria 
-2.331 
-1.893 
-2.846 
-1.773 
-2.664 
-10.310 
-6.645 
-15.424** 
-6.345 
-11.481 
7.311* 
14.412* 
3.661 
19.971* 
5.013*** 
 Source: Author’s estimation and Eviews 10 Output 
The results of further ADF and PP (with constant only) unit roots tests of  bilateral RER 
as exhibited in Table 10 below show that the null hypothesis of unit roots cannot be 
rejected for virtually all the WAMZ countries at 1% level of significance (except for some 
cases of three The Gambian-based RER and Liberia/ Guinea RER).  
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Table 10: Results of ADF and PP Unit Roots Tests of Real Exchange Rates 
  ADF  PP 
Home 
Country 
Foreign 
Country 
With Constant With Constant 
& Trend 
With Constant With Constant 
& Trend 
GAMBIA Ghana 
Guinea 
Liberia 
Nigeria 
S/Leone 
-8.059* 
-6.448* 
-1.847 
-7.032* 
-2.554 
-4.493* 
-4.457* 
-3.468*** 
-5.886* 
-2.459 
-15.018* 
-7.897* 
-1.881 
-6.948* 
-2.306 
11.576* 
-5.285* 
-2.190 
-5.816* 
-2.010 
GHANA Gambia 
Guinea 
Liberia 
Nigeria 
S/Leone 
3.441 
-3.918* 
2.876 
0.743 
0.473 
2.108 
-4.564* 
0.395 
0.935 
1.935 
4.033 
-2.519 
3.017 
1.485 
0.872 
2.173 
-2.308 
0.305 
-0.511 
-1.059 
GUINEA Gambia 
Ghana 
Liberia 
Nigeria 
S/Leone 
-1.847 
-2.414 
-2.086 
-2.523 
-1.785 
-1.499 
-2.525 
-1.527 
-2.342 
-2.492 
-1.824 
-1.908 
2.060 
-2.337 
-2.028 
-1.648 
-1.837 
-1.527 
-1.555 
-2.103 
LIBERIA Gambia 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Nigeria 
S/Leone 
-1.863 
-1.658 
-4.940* 
-2.805** 
-3.313** 
-2.069 
-5.991* 
-3.420** 
-3.221** 
3.416** 
-1.951 
-0.243 
-5.035* 
-2.850* 
-2.181 
-2.158 
-3.704** 
-3.457** 
-3.282*** 
-2.193 
NIGERIA Gambia 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Liberia 
S/Leone 
-1.585 
-2.390 
-6.589* 
-3.044** 
-2.871*** 
-2.175 
-3.900** 
-8.228* 
-3.380** 
4.800** 
-1.619 
-2.357 
-7.269* 
-3.032*** 
1.950 
-2.295 
-3.076 
-4.932* 
-3.435*** 
-2.401 
SIERRA Gambia 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Liberia 
Nigeria 
-2.361 
-1.334 
-2.221 
-3.458** 
-2.743** 
-2.312 
-2.973 
-3.614** 
3.540** 
3.894** 
-2.050 
-0.580 
2.815*** 
-2.156 
-1.966 
-1.950 
-1.908 
-3.498*** 
-2.101 
-2.401 
 Source: Author’s Estimation and Eviews 10 Output 
This consonance hugely confirmed the residual-based cointegration test results that the 
long run absolute PPP does not hold in WAMZ countries. The relative PPP correlation 
tests results in Table 11 below generally reflected low and medium linear association 
between changes in exchange rates and in relative price changes differentials. These 
results are not encouraging in giving supports for relative PPP across the WAMZ.  
On the overall, these PPP tests indicate that the validity of both absolute and relative PPP 
could not be established in the WAMZ, thus making PPP to be irrelevant in the exchange 
rate determination throughout the WAMZ. 
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Table 11 
Results of Correlation Tests of Relative PPP (in the WAMZ  
Home Country Foreign 
Country 
Correlation Home Country Foreign 
Country 
Correlation 
GAMBIA Ghana 
Guinea 
Liberia 
Nigeria 
S/Leone 
0.35 
0.64 
0.40 
0.07 
0.00 
LIBERIA Gambia 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Nigeria 
S/Leone 
0.36 
-0.00 
0.36 
0.20 
0.17 
GHANA Gambia 
Guinea 
Liberia 
Nigeria 
S/Leone 
0.33 
0.56 
0.01 
0.10 
0.34 
NIGERIA Gambia 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Liberia 
S/Leone 
0.04 
0.05 
0.54 
0.23 
-0.21 
GUINEA Gambia 
Ghana 
Liberia 
Nigeria 
S/Leone 
0.63 
0.58 
0.38 
0.56 
0.49 
SIERRA Gambia 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Liberia 
Nigeria 
-0.02 
0.34 
0.42 
0.19 
-0.19 Source: Author’s Estimation and Eviews 10 Output 
In Table 12 below, the results of Phillips-Ouliaris and Park’s Variable Added residual-
based cointegration tests for IFE depict that across the WAMZ, the null hypothesis of no 
cointegration of nominal interest rate differentials and inflation differentials cannot be 
rejected at 1% significance level in the Phillips-Ouliaris tests which thus produced 
evidence to infer that IFE failed to hold for these WAMZ’s bilateral relationships. It is 
significant to state at this point that these results yielded supports for the conjecture that 
if PPP fails to hold, IFE will not hold. However, there were mixed (and contradictory) 
output yielded by the Chi-square statistics of the Park’s Variable Added tests at 1% 
significance level. 
Table 12 
Results of Cointegration Tests for International Fisher Effects in the WAMZ 
  
Phillips-Oualiaris  
Tests 
 
Park’s Added 
Variable Tests 
Home 
Country 
Foreign 
Country 
tau-statistics z-statistics Chi-square 
GAMBIA Ghana 
Guinea 
Liberia 
Nigeria 
S/Leone 
-2.273 
-1.617 
-2.100 
-2.222 
-1.061 
-10.169 
-7.309 
-9.110 
-10.222 
-4.476 
0.346 
0.577 
46.700* 
5.367** 
4.405** 
GHANA Gambia 
Guinea 
Liberia 
Nigeria 
S/Leone 
-2.273 
-0.993 
-2.208 
-2.983 
-1.383 
10.169 
-3.134 
-10.479 
-15.925 
-5.803 
0.346 
0.182 
35.007* 
0.066 
1.079 
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GUINEA Gambia 
Ghana 
Liberia 
Nigeria 
S/Leone 
-1.616 
-0.993 
-1.310 
-1.593 
-2.338 
-7.309 
-3.134 
-3.164 
-4.901 
-9.626 
0.577 
0.082 
26.331* 
5.348** 
11.572 
LIBERIA Gambia 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Nigeria 
S/Leone 
-2.100 
-2.208 
-1.310 
-3.165*** 
-2.399 
-9.110 
-10.479 
-3.164 
-17.105*** 
-12.945 
46.700* 
35.007* 
26.331* 
9.447* 
0.001 
NIGERIA Gambia 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Liberia 
S/Leone 
-2.222 
-2.983 
-1.594 
-3.165*** 
-1.477 
-10.222 
-15.925 
-4.901 
-17.105*** 
-5.806 
5.368** 
0.066 
3.673** 
9.447* 
1.483 
S/LEONE Gambia 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Liberia 
Nigeria 
-1.062 
-1.383 
-2.339 
-2.399 
-1.477 
-4.476 
-5.803 
-9.626 
-12.945 
-5.806 
4.405 
1.079 
11.572* 
0.001 
1.483 Source: Author’s Estimation and Eviews 10 Output 
The results of the tests of Pearson moment correlation for UIP in the WAMZ are as 
exhibited in Table 13 below. The results revealed weak positive and negative correlations 
between exchange rate changes (appreciation and depreciation) and interest rate 
differentials across the WAMZ. The strongest of the linear association of 0.56 was 
recorded in the case of Guinea/Nigeria. 
Table 13: Results of Correlation Tests for Uncovered Interest Rate Parity (UIP) in the WAMZ 
Home Country Foreign 
Country 
Correlation Home Country Foreign 
Country 
Correlation 
GAMBIA Ghana 
Guinea 
Liberia 
Nigeria 
S/Leone 
0.14 
-0.04 
0.04 
-0.01 
-0.06 
LIBERIA Gambia 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Nigeria 
S/Leone 
-0.01 
0.24 
0.04 
-0.01 
-0.06 
GHANA Gambia 
Guinea 
Liberia 
Nigeria 
S/Leone 
0.15 
0.23 
0.27 
0.16 
0.11 
NIGERIA Gambia 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Liberia 
S/Leone 
0.08 
0.06 
0.07 
0.05 
-0.16 
GUINEA Gambia 
Ghana 
Liberia 
Nigeria 
S/Leone 
-0.03 
0.27 
0.11 
0.56 
-0.31 
SIERRA Gambia 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Liberia 
Nigeria 
-0.07 
-0.04 
-0.27 
-0.09 
-0.14 Source: Author’s Estimation and Eviews 10 Output 
 
Nevertheless, on the overall these results gave evidences to infer that UIP does not hold 
across the WAMZ. 
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3.3 Stylised Facts of Inflation-Unemployment Relationship – Phillips Curves 
Philips Curves indicate the relationship between inflation and unemployment rates in an 
economy. The notion here is that changes in the level of unemployment have direct and 
predictable effect of price inflation. This was propounded by Philips (1958) in his study 
of annual wage inflation and unemployment in the United Kingdom between 1860 and 
1957 in which Phillips found a consistent and stable inverse relationship between these 
two variables when he plotted the related scatter diagram. This had since been adopted 
as macroeconomic tool. Many economists (after Phillips) who performed similar studies 
based on other economies got similar results thus making Phillip’s proposition a stylised 
fact. The basis of the logical argument behind Phillip curve is that (i) a fiscal stimulus and 
increase in aggregate demand would sequentially increase demand for labour as 
government spending grows; (ii) there would be fall in pool of unemployed; (iii) firms 
would compete for the few workers by increasing nominal wages; (iv) there would be 
greater bargaining for labour to seek increase in nominal wages; (v) cost of wages will 
increase; and (vi) the increased cost of wages will be passed on to increases in price 
levels. This thus became a stylised fact which is verifiable in many economies.  To verify 
if the Phillip curve relationship hold in the WAMZ economies, statistical estimations of 
Pearson Moment Correlation of the CPI inflation rate and unemployment rates across the 
WAMZ were performed applying annual data covering the period between 1991 and 
2015. The resulting coefficients of correlation revealed the direction (and strength) of the 
relationship between the two variables involved. Table 14 below displays the results of 
the correlation estimation to establish if the Phillip curve relationship hold in the WAMZ 
countries (as developing countries) and the US (as a developed economy).  
Table 14: Results of Correlation Analysis of Phillip Curve Relationship in the WAMZ 
 Inflation/Unemployment 
Correlation Coefficient 
Gambia 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Liberia 
Nigeria 
S/Leone 
US 
0.05 
-0.02 
0.36 
0.17 
0.13 
0.006 
-0.28 
Source: Author’s Estimation and EViews 9.5 Output 
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Among the WAMZ countries, the results revealed very weak inverse relationship only for 
Ghana at -0.02 (apart from the negative relationship in the case of the US at -0.28). These 
are evidence to conclude that the Phillip curve relationship does not hold in the WAMZ 
(apart from Ghana) over the period covered by this study.  
 
3.4. Stylised Facts of Lucas Short-run Output/Inflation Trade-off  
Lucas (1973) hypothesised that average output will not be altered by the rate of inflation. The Lucas’ Phillips Curves Hypothesis’ implies that the condition for the output-inflation 
trade-off was the misinterpretation by economic agents, of their observed price 
movements. In his cross-country study of 18 countries for the period between 1953 and 
1967, Lucas found out that in high inflation countries, there is a quick reflection of 
changes in aggregate demand on price while the effects on output are relatively small. In 
countries with low inflation or rather, price instability, the initial effect of increase in 
nominal incomes on real output are large while the positive effects on inflation rate is 
small. The simple indication of these is that as there is increase in the variance of inflation, 
the trade-off between output and inflation will deteriorate because of the ability of 
economic agents in high inflation countries to distinguish between nominal shocks and 
real shocks. Lucas (1973) was of the view that unanticipated inflation is the condition 
upon which there can be a trade-off between output and inflation. His position was that 
there will be alteration to the behaviours of economic agents if the general price level 
movements are erroneously taken to be an indication of relative price changes. Such 
change in the behaviour of economic agents will cause employment and real output to fluctuate around their ‘natural’ levels. The moment these economic agents are able to 
know that changes in price are not market specific but general, each of the real variables 
would be forced to move back to the initial level because of homogeneity of degree zero 
of the supply functions. What the Lucas model of Phillips curves connotes is the inverse 
relationship between the real output response and the variability of inflation and 
aggregate demand. The objective of this section was to test the validity of the Lucas model 
of Phillips curve and determine if it holds in both the formal economies and the informal 
developing economies of the WAMZ. 
For the assessment of output/inflation trade-off which covers the period between 
1991and 2015, annual data for nominal GDP, and real GDP were collected for the six 
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WAMZ countries. Estimations of output/inflation trade-off for the WAMZ countries were 
carried the model suggested by Lucas (1973): 𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝜏∆𝑥𝑡 + 𝜆𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝑇 + 𝜀𝑡.                                                          15 
Where 𝑦𝑡  is log of real GDP; ∆𝑥𝑡  is first difference of the log of nominal GDP; 𝜆𝑦𝑡−1 is one-
period lag of log real GDP; 𝑇 is time trend (0 < 𝜏 < 1 and 𝜆 < 1). Equation 15 has been 
widely used by the new classical (Lucas, 1978) and new Keynesian economists (Schultze, 
1984; Ball, Mankiw and Romer, 1998 etc.) as an empirical fact. The parameter of interest 
(which is the trade-off parameter and a measure of the slope of Phillips curve) is the 
parameter of change in nominal output (𝜏∆𝑥𝑡). It determines how much of shock to 
nominal income shows up in real output. A large coefficient indicates that changes in 
nominal output growth are associated with real output in the short run. A coefficient close 
to unity indicates a shallow Phillips curve, meaning that all changes in nominal output 
show up in real output growth while a coefficient value close zero depicts a very steep 
Phillip curves which indicates that all changes in nominal income show up in price. This 
theoretical model suggests that in countries experiencing high variances in inflation rate 
and nominal output growth rate, the trade-off parameter should be low, hence a steeper 
Phillip curves.  
The results of the OLS estimations of output-inflation trade-off in the WAMZ (including 
the diagnostic tests) are displayed in Table 15 below. Nominal output growth (the 
parameter interest) reported positive coefficients for all the countries assessed, but 
significant only for The Gambia and Liberia. The diagnostic tests show that for all the 
estimations, there are no residual serial correlation and heteroscedasticity problems 
while normality problem are established in the cases of Ghana, Liberia and Nigeria. 
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Table 15: Results of the Estimation of Short-run Output-Inflation Trade-Off for the WAMZ 
Countries ‘Formal’ Economies 
Dependent Variable: Real Output  
 Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria S/Leone 
Constant 
∆Nominal Output  
Lagged Real Output  
Time Trend 
 
R2 
DW-Statistics 
F-Statistics 
 
Diagnostic Tests 
JB Statistics for 
Normality  
 
Breusch-Godfrey 
Autocorrelation  
 
Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey 
Heteroscedasticity 
13.1839* 
0.2771* 
0.4289** 
0.0193 
 
0.99 
1.92 
0.00 
 
 
0.5637 
(0.75) 
 
0.0193 
(0.98) 
 
0.6751 
(0.57) 
1.5221 
0.0183 
0.9346 
0.0052 
 
0.99 
1.25 
0.00 
 
 
20.379 
(0.00) 
 
1.5417 
(0.24) 
 
1.2086 
(0.33) 
1.4544 
0.0062 
0.9516* 
0.0002 
 
0.99 
2.10 
0.00 
 
 
0.3581 
(0.84) 
 
1.3242 
(0.29) 
 
0.9109 
(0.45) 
-1.1136 
1.1197* 
1.0592* 
-0.0085 
 
0.98 
1.52 
0.00 
 
 
12.7078 
(0.00) 
 
1.3916 
(0.27) 
 
1.0929 
(0.38) 
7.0958** 
0.0415 
0.7665* 
0.0170** 
 
0.98 
1.76 
0.00 
 
 
111.974 
(0.00) 
 
0.1267 
(0.88) 
 
1.3018 
(0.30) 
9.1765** 
0.1571 
0.6779* 
0.192* 
 
0.95 
1.92 
0.00 
 
 
4.6689 
(0.10) 
 
0.9447 
(0.41) 
 
0.7230 
(0.55) Source: Author’ Estimation and EViews 9.5Output 
Note: *, ** and ** denote 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance respectively. The p-values are in parentheses. 
 
Table 16 below exhibits the rates of variations in inflation and GDP growth as well as the 
OLS estimated trade-off parameter. 
Table 16 Variabilities and Trade-off Parameter in WAMZ Countries’ ‘Formal’ Economies (1991-2015) 
 
Variability& Trade-off 
Parameter 
 
Gambia 
 
Ghana 
 
Guinea 
 
Liberia 
 
Nigeria 
 
S/Leone 
Nominal Income Growth  5.82 15.60 9.85 23.75 31.31 13.88 
Inflation Rate  4.60 14.90 9.84 7.92 31.28 20.23 
Trade-off Coefficients 0.28 0.02 0.01 1.12 0.04 0.16 
Source: Author’s Estimations 
To verify the stylised fact of the positive correlation of high output growth/inflation 
variabilities and low output-inflation trade off parameter over the period covered by this 
assessment for the formal economies of the WAMZ, it is evident in Table 16 above that 
this could well be established for Ghana and Nigeria exhibiting high variations in output 
and inflation and corresponding low output-inflation trade-off coefficients. However, this 
failed in the cases of Guinea with low variabilities of inflation (9.84) and nominal GDP 
growth (9.85) displaying the lowest trade-off parameter. For Liberia, reporting the 
highest significant trade-off parameter of 1.12, the stylised fact holds only for the country’s inflation variation of 7.92 and not for the high variability of 23.75 in nominal 
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output growth. For the Gambia having the WAMZ lowest variabilities in both nominal 
output (5.82) and inflation (4.60), it is expected that the trade-off parameter be higher 
than 0.28 generated, if the stylised fact is to hold. On the other hand, for this same reason 
it is expected that the trade-off parameter for Sierra Leone be higher than the 0.16 
yielded. 
Further to the investigations of the output-inflation trade-off for the formal economies of 
the WAMZ, assessments of the informal economies were equally performed. Data for 
nominal income, real income and inflation were generated for the informal economies of 
the WAMZ in relation to informal activities estimations as percentages of GDP, derived by 
Medina and Schneider (2018) and presented in Table 1. The results of the OLS 
estimations of the trade-off coefficients for the informal economies are presented in 
Table 17 below, highlighting the trade-off coefficients as significant at 1% level of 
significance for Ghana and Nigeria respectively. The coefficients for Sierra Leone was not 
statistically significant. The diagnostic tests revealed residual normality problem only for 
The Gambia and Guinea. While there were no heteroscedasticity issue for these OLS 
estimations, autoregression of the residuals was reported only for The Gambia. The 
goodness-of-fit were reasonable and the estimations are all jointly significant.  
Table 17: Short-run Output-Inflation Trade-Off Estimations for the WAMZ’s Informal Economies   
Dependent Variable: Real Output  
 Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria S/Leone 
Constant 
∆Nominal Output  
Lagged Real Output  
Time Trend 
 
R2 
DW-Statistics 
F-Statistics 
 
Diagnostic Tests 
JB Statistics for 
Normality  
 
Breusch-Godfrey 
Autocorrelation  
 
Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey 
Heteroscedasticity 
5.1841 
0.6641* 
0.7229* 
0.0635 
 
0.99 
1.53 
0.00 
 
 
19.5446 
(0.00) 
 
6.3929 
(0.00) 
 
0.7921 
(0.51) 
2.2468 
0.2434** 
0.8979* 
0.0071 
 
0.93 
1.10 
0.00 
 
 
0.5018 
(0.78) 
 
2.3375 
(0.12) 
 
1.4194 
(0.74) 
-4.7285 
0.5961* 
1.2226* 
-0.0777 
 
0.94 
1.76 
0.00 
 
 
9.4054 
(0.00) 
 
0.5158 
(0.61) 
 
1.7848 
(0.18) 
-3.4909 
1.0683* 
1.1744* 
-0.0038 
 
0.97 
2.27 
0.00 
 
 
0.2037 
(0.90) 
 
1.9757 
(0.19) 
 
2.6485 
(0.10) 
9.1143* 
0.2864*** 
0.6307* 
0.0243* 
 
0.98 
2.08 
0.00 
 
 
6.007 
(0.05) 
 
0.9415 
(0.41) 
 
3.7680 
(0.37) 
9.4870* 
0.1342 
0.5270 
0.1561* 
 
0.95 
2.02 
0.00 
 
 
0.3126 
(0.85) 
 
0.3888 
(0.68) 
 
1.2546 
(0.32) Source: Author’ Estimation and EViews 9.5Output 
Note: *, ** and ** denote 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance respectively. The p-values are in parentheses. 
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Comparative results of the OLS estimated trade-off coefficients, rates of variations in 
inflation and GDP growth as reported in Table 18 below glaringly reveal that the Lucas 
output-inflation trade-off conjecture could not hold clearly in the informal economies of 
the WAMZ.  
Table 18: Variabilities and Trade-off Parameter in WAMZ’s ‘Informal’ Economies (1991-2015) 
 
Variability& Trade-off 
Parameter 
Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria S/Leone 
Nominal Income Growth  9.97 9.66 19.19 11.09 15.51 12.57 
Inflation Rate  13.29 6.36 7.61 3.75 17.97 12.29 
Trade-off Coefficients 0.66 0.24 0.60 1.07 0.29 0.13 Source: Author’s Estimations 
Although, the closest, Nigeria and Sierra Leone generated high nominal income growth 
variabilities of 15.51 and 12.57 respectively and the corresponding high inflation 
variabilities of 17.97 and 12.29 respectively, these two countries could only yield trade-off coefficients of 0.29 and 0.13 respectively. These results were not as sharp and ‘clear-cut’ as what were generated for the formal economies.  
Consequent upon these, it could be inferred here that the Lucas output-inflation trade-off 
hold better in the formal economies of the WAMZ than the informal economies.  
 
4. Stylised Facts of Exchange Rates and Foreign Exchange Markets Behaviour  
As background to the study of exchange rate and markets behaviours within the WAMZ, 
it is essential to have initial insights into the trends in the historical developments of 
foreign exchange markets and regimes with which the six WAMZ countries operated over 
the years. Table 19 below summarises the historical trend of exchange rate regimes 
across the WAMZ. The historical developments of exchange rate regimes of the WAMZ 
countries (as highlighted above) reveal that the WAMZ countries adopted various mixed 
exchange rate regimes over the years, particularly during the post-1973 floating 
exchange era. The common feature is that virtually all the WAMZ economies operate 
floating exchange rate regime (pure, free or managed) over the period covered by various 
assessments and analyses in this paper.  
Financial markets generally trend in manners in which yields or prices of financial 
market instruments usually show some behaviour, characteristics and features that can 
be generalised, given the nature of the time series (univariate or multivariate). 
Exchange rates are time series of foreign exchange markets within financial markets.  
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Table 19: Summary of Historical Development of Exchange Rate Determination and Regimes in the 
WAMZ 
The Gambia 
Exchange Rate Regime/Method of Exchange Rate Determination Period 
Fixed Exchange Rate System 1955-1985 
Floating Exchange Rate System (IFEM) 1990 
Introduction of Parallel Market – Bureau de Change (BDC) and dual Exchange System 1990-2003 
Dual Exchange Rate System Scrapped 2003 
Ghana 
Exchange Rate Regime/Method of Exchange Rate Determination Period 
Fixed Exchange Rate Regime (Pegged to British Pound) 1957-1966 
Fixed Exchange Rate Regime (Pegged to US Dollar) 1966-1982 
Multiple Exchange Rate System  1983-1986 
Dual Exchange Rate System – Dual Retail Auction 1986-1987 
Dutch Auction System 1987-1988 
Foreign Exchange Bureaux 1988-1989 
Wholesale and Interbank Systems 1990-1992 
Interbank Foreign Exchange Market 1992 
Guinea 
Exchange Rate Regime/Method of Exchange Rate Determination Period 
Fixed Exchange Rate System (pegged to dollar and SDR) 1958-1985 
Creation of Second Foreign Exchange Market/Weekly Auction 1985 
Flexible Exchange Rate Regime and IFEM Weekly Auction 1994-2000 
Monthly Auction System 2000-2002 
Fixed Exchange System (pegged to dollar) 2002-2004 
Stoppage of Monthly Auction/Reintroduction of Weekly Auction and Arithmetic Average 
Exchange Rate System 
2005 
Liberia 
Exchange Rate Regime/Method of Exchange Rate Determination Period 
Dollarised Economy – Extensive use of Foreign Currency 1847-1980s 
Fixed Exchange Rate Regime (pegged to US dollar) 1981-1997 
Free Floating Exchange Rate System  1998-2000 
Managed Floating Exchange Rate Regime 2000 
Nigeria 
Exchange Rate Regime/Method of Exchange Rate Determination Period 
Fixed Exchange Regime (Pegged to British pound sterling/US dollars)  1960-1986 
Floating Exchange Rate System & Second-tier Foreign Exchange Market (SFEM) April 1987 
Creation of Interbank Foreign Exchange Market (IFEM)  January 1989 
Autonomous Foreign Exchange Market  1995 - 1999 
Interbank  Foreign Exchange Market 1999-2002 
Dutch Auction System (DAS)  2000- 2006 
Wholesale Dutch Auction System (wDAS) 2006-2013 
Retail Wholesale Dutch Auction System (rDAS)  October 2013 
Interbank Foreign Exchange Market (Closure of Official Window)  February 2015 
Sierra Leone 
Exchange Rate Regime/Method of Exchange Rate Determination  Period 
Fixed Exchange Rate Regime (Pegged to British Pound) 1964-1978 Fixed Exchange Rate Regime (linked to the IMF’s Special Drawing Rights) 1978-1982 
Dual Exchange Rate Regimes 1982-1983 
Fixed Exchange Rate (Unification of the Dual Rates) 1983-1986 
Managed/Floating Exchange Rate Regimes 1986-1990 
Free Floating Exchange Rate Regime 1990 to date Source: Author’s compilation 
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Many empirical studies on the behaviour of exchange rate and foreign exchange market 
across developed, emerging and developing economies have established many 
regularities which are stylised facts. The common trend in literature is that stylised facts 
of exchange rates and market development are drawn mainly from empirical findings 
based on researches on developed and few emerging economies. 
The following sub-sections discuss eight of these known stylised facts and empirical 
regularities of exchange rates and foreign exchange markets as well as what obtain about 
them in the WAMZ countries. 
(I) Absence of Normality: It is a known assertion that percentage changes in nominal 
exchange rate and exchange rate returns do not exhibit normal distribution.  
Table 20: Statistical Properties of US Dollar Nominal Exchange Rate Returns and Percentage 
Changes for the WAMZ Countries (1995M1-2015M12) 
Nominal US Dollar Exchange Rate Returns 
 
Skewness 
Kurtosis 
JB Stat.(p-values) 
Observations 
Ghana Gambia Guinea Liberia Nigeria S/Leone 
0.29 -0.67 -0.36 -0.71 13.24 1.28 
14.77 11.01 21.63 13.27 197.48 10.33 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
298 298 298 298 298 298 
Nominal US Dollar Exchange Rate Percentage Change 
 
Skewness 
Kurtosis 
JB Stat.(p-values) 
Observations 
Ghana Gambia Guinea Liberia Nigeria S/Leone 
0.76 -0.24 0.64 0.13 15.53 1.64 
12.51 10.47 22.45 13.17 254.62 11.31 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
298 298 298 298 298 298 
Nominal US Dollar Exchange Rate 
 
Skewness 
Kurtosis 
JB Stat.(p-values) 
Observations 
Ghana Gambia Guinea Liberia Nigeria S/Leone 
1.45  0.36  0.53  0.49 -0.39  0.16 
5.00  1.99  1.69  2.13  1.66  1.89 
0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
299  299  299  299  299  299 Source: Author’s Estimation, EIU Database and Eviews 9.5 Output 
The summary statistics of the properties of monthly nominal exchange rates and 
exchange returns (1995M1 to 2015M12) for the WAMZ countries are shown in Table 20 
above. 
The J-B statistical tests of normality clearly confirm with the stylised fact in all the cases 
of the WAMZ countries where they yielded p-value of 0.00 for nominal exchange, 
exchange rate returns and exchange rate percentage changes in which the null hypothesis 
of normal distribution is rejected. 
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(II) Persistence and Clustering of Volatility: Volatility of exchange rate is persistent. 
High and low variations in exchange rates can last for some period and this causes 
volatility clusters which are observed periods of high and low volatility. The reason 
attributed to volatility clustering in many research studies is ‘fat tail distribution’ which 
emanates from excess kurtosis in non-normal distribution, which are on the overall 
prompted by the nature of the financial data (Clark, 1973) and switch from the ideas of 
fundamental and technical analysts in times of uncertainties (Lux and Marchesi, 2000). 
Evidences that this stylised fact holds are apparent in the plots of percentage changes of 
the WAMZ countries in Figure 1 below. 
Figure 1: Plots of Monthly Nominal US Dollar Exchange Percentage Change for the 
WAMZ Countries (1991M1 to 2015M12) 
 
Source: Authors Estimation and EViews 9.5 Output 
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Figure 2: Plots of Annual Nominal US Dollar Exchange Percentage Change for the WAMZ Countries 
(1991-2015) 
 Source: Authors’ Estimation, EIU Database and EViews 9.5 Output 
 
(III) Volatility and Frequency of Data: The nature of volatility of explained by specific 
frequency of data. Some characteristics of percentage change or exchange rate return as 
well as volatility clustering show-up in the uncertainties in the market aggregates in low 
frequency time series (Diebold, 1988). Figure 2 above exhibits annual percentage 
changes in the nominal US dollar exchange rates of the WAMZ countries over same period 
covered by higher frequency (monthly data) in Figure 1 above. The fact in this empirical 
regularity are apparent when comparison is made between the volatility in both plots 
(covering same period of time), given the different frequencies. 
(IV) Asymmetric Effects: Generally in financial markets, it is established that there are always ‘leverage effects’ which are indications of when high volatilities are always 
preceded by currency depreciation, which is a downward movement in percentage 
change in financial data which may be due to financial risks emanating from fall in prices. 
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These are made very clear in Figure 2 virtually in all the countries except for Nigeria 
where this is less pronounced.  
(V) Presence of Unit Roots (Non-stationary) in Floating Nominal Exchange Rate: For 
two freely floating currencies, the nominal exchange rate and the logarithm of the 
nominal exchange rate are non-stationary, but stationary at the first difference.  
Table 21: Results of the ADF Unit Root Tests of Annual US Dollar Nominal Exchange Rates of the 
WAMZ Countries (2000-2015) 
 Nominal Exchange Rate 
(at Level) 
Log of Nominal 
Exchange Rate (at 
Level) 
First Difference of Log. 
Nominal Exchange Rate 
Gambia -2.5618 -0.5374 -5.3469* 
Ghana -1.5119 -0.7038 -5.1798* 
Guinea -1.8510 -0.6442 -4.9862* 
Liberia -2.1408 -3.8378* -12.1478* 
Nigeria -2.1345 -1.7711 -4.9348* 
S/Leone -1.9765 -7.4731* -4.3683* 
Critical values of ADF Unit Roots Test 
1% 5% 10% 
-3.9591 -3.0810 -2.6813 Source: Author’s Estimation, EIU Database and EViews 9.5 Output 
The output in Table 21 above reflect the stylised facts in point apart from the cases of 
Liberia and Sierra Leone which have stationary logarithm of their nominal exchange rate. 
Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone were known to have some forms of fixed arrangement 
in the par relationship with the US dollars in the history of exchange rate system 
developments trends, up till the 1980s and 1990s. This is a further confirmation of this 
stylised fact.  
(VI) Calendar Effects or Regular Events: Empirical studies have established that the 
time of trade effects are significant in foreign exchange markets. Weekends and holidays 
are regular events that impact the volatility of exchange rates. It is empirically established 
that exchange rate volatility is lower during holidays and weekends than what obtain 
during trading week days because of the accumulative effects of information during 
holidays and weekends (Miller, 1988 and Abraham and Ikenberry, 1994). In developing 
economies (as the WAMZ), exchange rate volatility is commonly influenced by general 
elections and effects of politics when monetary and fiscal policies are relaxed to appease 
voters, particularly during an election year.   
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Figure 3: Plots of Monthly Nominal US Dollar Exchange Percentage Change for the WAMZ 
Countries (2008-2015) 
 Source: Author’s Estimations, IMF Database and Eviews 9.5 Output 
Figure 3 above displays plots of US dollar monthly nominal exchange rate percentage 
changes across the six WAMZ countries between 2008 and 2015. Seasonal celebrations 
like Christmas is a regular event as the close of the year in most WAMZ countries. These 
charts establishes the empirical regularity of seasonal holidays causing exchange rate to 
witness different degrees of volatility before and beyond the festive period. This are 
usually caused by high levels of demand for imported goods around this period, thereby 
causing exchange rate to depart from its equilibrium point due the excess demand for 
foreign exchange. 
(VII) Dominance of the Effects of Macroeconomic News: It is stylised fact that there is 
link between information and news about macroeconomic fundamentals (like inflation, 
money supply, interest rate and output) and volatility of exchange rate. The significant 
connection between German deutschemark/US dollar exchange rate and announcement 
made on macroeconomic fundamental of the US was established by Andersen and 
Bollerslev (1998). However, the evidence gathered by Kim, Yoon and Kim (2004) is that 
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it is the contents of macroeconomic news that influence exchange rate behaviours and 
market reactions and not the actual release of the news. Findings by Laakkonen (2007) 
relate to the nature of the macroeconomic news in which evidence was gathered to 
conclude that exchange rate volatility is increased by bad news than by good news; and 
that volatility is increased by conflicting news than by consistent news. Furthermore, this 
stylised fact was verified in the case of the Nigerian US dollar bilateral nominal exchange 
rate returns by estimating the Threshold GARCH (TGARCH) and the Exponential GARCH 
(EGARCH) models of this exchange returns.  
In the TGARCH (1,1), the conditional variance for the WAMZ countries is specified as: 𝜎𝑡2 = 𝛿 + 𝛼1𝜇𝑡−12 + 𝛽1𝜇𝑡−12 𝑑𝑡−1 + 𝛾1𝜎𝑡−12                                                        16 
where 𝑑𝑡−1 takes the values of 1 if 𝜇𝑡 < 0, and the value of 0 if 𝜇𝑡 ≥ 0. 𝛽1 is the asymmetry 
or leverage term. The positive shocks (good news) and the negative shock (bad news) 
have different effects. When there is positive shock, the effect on volatility is 𝛼1, while in 
the case of negative shock, the effect of volatility is 𝛼1 + 𝛽1. Therefore, there is larger effect 
of bad news (negative shocks) on the conditional variance 𝜎𝑡2 than positive shocks. If  𝛽1 >0, this indicates asymmetry while 𝛽1 = 0 means the effect of the news is symmetric and 
the model collapses to the standard GARCH model.3 Exponential GARCH (EGARCH) 
allows for asymmetries testing. The specification of EGARCH (1,1) could be modelled as:  log(𝜎𝑡2) = 𝛿 + 𝛽1 ln(𝜎𝑡−12 ) + 𝛾1 ( 𝜇𝑡−1√𝜎𝑡−12 ) + 𝛼1 [|𝜇𝑡−1|√𝜎𝑡−12 − √2𝜋]                                       17 
where 𝛿, 𝛼, 𝛽 and 𝛾 (the leverage term) are the parameters to be estimated. The left hand 
side of the equation is the log of the conditional variance series. This makes the leverage 
effect to be exponential rather than quadratic and thus makes the estimates of the 
conditional variance to be non-negative. The implications of the signs of the symmetry 
parameter in these two asymmetric GARCH model (TGARCH and EGARCH) is that there 
is larger impact of bad news or negative shocks on volatility foreign exchange returns 
than good news or positive shocks when the asymmetry parameter  (𝛾) yields significant 
                                                          
3 Another simple extension of GARCH is the GJR model which incorporates additional term to account for possible 
asymmetries. The conditional variance GJR GARCH (1,1) is expressed as  = δ + α1μt−12 + β1σt−12 + γ1μt−12 It−1, where It−1 
takes the value of 1 if μt−1 < 0 and the value of when otherwise. For the WAMZ countries, the GJR GARCH model is not 
employed.  
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positive signs in TGARCH and significant negative signs in EGARCH. Table 22 below 
displays the results of the GARCH (1, 2), TGARCH (1, 2) and EGARCH (1,2) models 
estimations for the Nigerian naira/US dollar exchange returns. 
Table 22: Results of the Estimations of the TGARCH (1,2) and EGARCH  Models for US Dollar/ 
Nigerian Naira Exchange Rate Returns 
Parameters TGARCH (1,2) EGRACH (1,2) 𝛿 
 𝛼 
 𝛽 (-1) 𝛽 (-2) 
 𝛾 
 
Log likelihood: 
No of Observations: 
1.26E-06** 
 
0.334* 
 
0.573* 
0.133 
 
-0.140** 
 
21149.76 
5064 
1.261* 
 
0.374* 
 
0.825* 
0.082 
 
0.056 
 
20937.90 
5064 
        Source: Author's estimations and Eviews 7 Output 
        Note:*At 1% Significance level; ** at 5% Significance level; *** at 10% Significance level.  
The TGARCH (1,2) for the Nigerian naira/US dollar exchange returns estimation results 
show negative and significant (at 5% level of significance) coefficient of asymmetry (𝛾) 
of -0.140 and a positive but insignificant coefficient of asymmetry (𝛾) of 0.056 in EGARCH 
(1,2). The inference from these is that there are asymmetries in the news/shocks in the 
Nigerian foreign exchange markets. Bad news has larger influence on the volatility of 
foreign exchange returns in Nigeria than good news. This stylised fact holds in this case. 
(VIII) Non-isolation of Exchange Rate from Markets Volatility: Economic and political 
uncertainties as well as volatilities in different financial markets impact exchange rate 
and exchange market volatilities. This means that there are penetration into and 
influence on foreign exchange markets, of information and economic disturbances 
emanating from some other markets. Calvert et al (2006) got evidence of covariance 
towards the same direction, of exchange rate volatility and prices of gold and oil with a 
suggestion that these primary commodities are like proxies for worldwide economic 
risks.  
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Table 23: Nominal US Dollar Exchange Rate Percentage Changes in the WAMZ (2001-2015) 
 Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria S/Leone 
2001 22.6 31.4 11.7 18.8 9.4 -5.1 
2002 27.0 10.6 1.23 27.0 8.4 5.7 
2003 43.2 9.4 0.4 -3.8 7.2 11.9 
2004 5.26 3.8 13.0 -7.5 2.8 151 
2005 -4.8 0.7 62.4 4.0 -1.2 7.0 
2006 -1.8 1.1 41.3 1.6 -2.0 2.5 
2007 -11.4 2.1 -18.5 5.6 -2.2 0.8 
2008 -10.8 13.1 9.6 3.1 -5.8 -0.1 
2009 20.1 33.2 4.3 8.0 25.6 13.6 
2010 5.1 1.6 19.3 4.6 0.9 17.5 
2011 5.2 5.6 16.3 1.1 2.4 9.3 
2012 8.9 18.8 4.9 1.8 2.4 -0.1 
2013 12.1 8.8 -1.1 5.5 -0.1 -0.3 
2014 16.1 31.4 1.53 8.2 0.8 4.4 
2015 22.7 10.6 6.7 2.7 21.4 12.3 Source: Author’s Estimations and EViews 9.5 Output 
The decline and dwindle in the prices of primary commodities over the last decade may 
have been the reason for continued depreciation in the currencies of these primary 
commodity exporting WAMZ countries over same period as exhibited in Table 23 above 
showing percentage depreciation of the currencies of the WAMZ countries between 
2001 and 2015. 
Although, The Gambia, Liberia and Nigeria’ currencies experienced annual appreciation 
of currency one year or the other, around 2003 and 2007, the movements in the value of the WAMZ countries’ currency  during the global financial crisis period between 2008 
and 2009 and thereafter reflect significant sharp depreciation, these confirmed that this 
stylised fact holds in the WAMZ. 
 
5. Conclusions  
This paper evaluated some stylised facts for the WAMZ economies. Efforts were made to 
consider some popular macroeconomic empirical regularities like Phillips curves 
relationship, Lucas output/inflation trade-off, international parity conditions as well as 
relationships between domestic cyclical output and some macroeconomic variables in 
order to determine if there are supports for the stylised facts on co-movements and 
variability in developing and developing economies. Across the WAMZ and the selected 
developed economies (Germany, The UK and the US), the results yielded from this 
exercise were mixed in confirming or refuting the stylised facts evaluated. In spite of this, 
what was significantly achieved here was the exposure of the relevant nature and 
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features of salient aspects of the economies of the WAMZ under monetary integration 
assessments. There are evidences here to draw conclusion that co-movements of cyclical 
components of macroeconomic series with real output as well as the fluctuations and 
variability of these macroeconomic variables follow similar patterns in the developing 
economies (of the WAMZ) and the developed economies sampled in this study. It is also 
evident in this chapter that virtually all the stylised facts of exchange rates and exchange 
market behaviour got supports from the WAMZ countries.  
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